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Abstract
I study the effects of product concept demonstrations on firm value and on firms’ profit using
two different methods: empirical and analytical approaches.
Utilizing an event study, in Essay 1, I assess the effects of product concept demonstrations
in trade shows on abnormal stock returns and risks. My investigation has two interconnected
parts: (1) analysis of the firm’s decision on how many concepts to demonstrate and what
would be the concept mix; and (2) analysis of investor reactions to the demonstration that
influence the firm value and risk. I find that the number of concept demonstrations are
influenced by the innovativeness of the concept mix, the demonstrating firm’s past conversion
history of concepts to commercialization, and the total number of concepts demonstrations,
reflecting the size of the trade show. As a result, the concepts demonstrations for the
first-time positively influence cumulative abnormal return, but the effects of demonstrating
previously demonstrated concepts are negative.
In Essay 2, I develop a two-period game-theoretic model to analyze the inter-temporal
strategic interactions in a firm’s pricing strategy for the old and new models with a product
concept demonstration. My analysis provides new insights into the interplay of product
positioning and a product concept demonstration that induces varying degrees of purchase
delay while shaping the firm’s dynamic pricing strategy. As a result, I find that a product
concept demonstration can lower the new model price even below what it would be without
a demonstration; further, I find that the volume of delayed purchases induced by a product
concept demonstration is the greatest at very low or very high levels of product substitutability, exhibiting a U-shaped pattern. My findings suggest that differentiating the new model

either horizontally or vertically is a critical factor for profitable pre-launch product concept
demonstration. However, the mechanisms that lead to concept demonstration profitability
are quite different between the two types of differentiation. Allowing various scenarios of
product line and pricing policies, I find that the simpler pricing policy can dominate more
complex pricing strategies.
Overall, the influences of the product concept demonstrations are researched through
both empirical and analytical methods. The results of this dissertation suggest that innovative product concept demonstration generates positive firm value in the short run. Product
concept demonstration also creates greater profit when the new product concept is either
horizontally or vertically differentiated.
Keywords: Product concept demonstration, firm value, event study, pricing, inter-temporal,
product differentiation, game theory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of three chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the fundamentals of product concept demonstration; Chapter 2 deals with the effects of product concept demonstrations on firm value and risks; and Chapter 3 studies the inter-temporal pricing strategy with
a product concept demonstration in a monopoly market.

1.1

Overview

In this chapter, I provide a thorough review on a product concept demonstration by utilizing
two different modeling approaches. The first empirical method captures the overall effects
of product concept demonstrations on firm value and risks. By assessing this short-term
impact of marketing actions, the results suggest that technology-oriented product concept
demonstration generates greater firm values than design oriented concept demonstration.
Managers in many durable product-markets are faced with a variety of challenges even
before launching products. One challenge is that firms require marketing metrics to forecast the market potential of new products based upon a tangible measure of feedbacks from
consumers and investors. Specifically, annual auto shows in major cities are popular examples of a concept testing procedure. In this process, trade shows are necessary for firms

1
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not only to test concepts while receiving feedback from potential customers but also to develop and demonstrate concepts in a variety of stages from the pure concept stage to the
production-ready car. A unique feature of demonstrations of new product concepts (rather
than production-ready products) is the long lag time between the initial demonstration of
a concept and its launch, and the consequent uncertainty about whether the demonstrated
concept will be developed or commercialized at all.
Another issue of interest to managers is how to strategically demonstrate firm’s new product concepts in trade shows to maximize both firms’ profit and firms’ value. Exacerbating
these challenges, the success of a new product introduction partially depends on understanding what drives the equilibrium level of quality without cannibalizing own product line
demand and maximizing profit. I develop two models: one empirical model to study the
effects of product concept demonstrations on the firm value and risk, and one game-theoretic
model to study inter-temporal pricing strategies for the old and new model with a product
concept demonstration in a trade show. Furthermore, it is important for managers to communicate these product concepts with consumers through trade show. Traditionally, a trade
show is a kind of direct market so that potential consumers can visit the show, experience
the product attributes, interact with sales persons, and, as a result, possibly purchase the
product.
Trade shows have become a popular venue for firms to showcase their innovative activities
to their industry cohorts and to the public in general. Demonstrations of new “productionready” products in trade shows are aimed at creating awareness, interest, and sales leads.
Product concepts, on the other hand, are demonstrated months or even years before their
actual launch, and indeed many concepts do not even make it to the next stages of the
product development process. Because of the uncertainty in the conversion of the concepts
into a marketable product, and because the benefits of concepts, if any, accrue far into the
future, it is difficult to assess the contemporaneous effects via commonly used marketing
metrics such as sales leads or actual sales. Therefore, I employ an event study methodology
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to assess the effects of concept demonstrations in a trade show context. In Essay 1 presented
in Chapter 2, I examine the signaling effects of concept demonstrations on firm value and
risk.
After showing managerial implications of product concept demonstrations by using marketing metrics, in Essay 2 presented in Chapter 3, I employ a game theoretic approach to
examine the roles of product concept demonstrations in inter-temporal pricing strategies for
the product line to maximize the total profit of two periods. Thus, the second essay provides
micro-economic foundations of product concept demonstrations in a monopoly market. Incorporating both vertical and horizontal product differentiation, I provide new insights into
the interplay of product positioning and a product concept demonstration that induces varying degrees of purchase delay while shaping the firm’s dynamic pricing strategy.

1.2

Effects of Product Concept Demonstration (PCD)
in Trade Shows on Firm Value & Risks

Trade shows have become a popular venue for firms to demonstrate new products or new
product concepts to their industry cohorts and to the public in general.

In the U.S.

alone, approximately 2,500 trade shows are organized each year by different industry groups
(http://tradeshow.tradekey.com/). Products demonstrated in trade shows range from food,
agriculture, and consumer goods to consumer electronics, computers, and construction materials. Over the years, the popularity of product demonstrations in trade shows has grown
exponentially. For instance, computer shows organized by COMPUTEX Taipei (or Taipei
International Information Technology) in June 2008 attracted over 100,000 visitors. Likewise, the video games convention organized by Leipzig Games Convention in August 2008
brought in over 200,000 visitors. Although some trade shows restrict admissions only to
trade representatives or exhibitors, most open the shows to the public, press, and business
analysts.
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Despite the widespread use of trade shows as a means to create interests and develop
sales leads, especially for industrial products, research on the effectiveness of demonstrating
commercial products or product concepts is limited. Utilizing data on one trade show,
Gopalakrishna and Lilien (1995) demonstrate that trade show characteristics such as preshow
promotions, booth space, and use of attention-getting techniques increase the likelihood of
trade show attendees to visit the booth, while the number and training of booth salespersons
positively affects the likelihood of establishing contacts with the salesperson at the booth and
producing sales leads. In a more comprehensive study covering large samples of trade shows
in the U.S. and U.K., Dekimpe et al. (1995) generalizes the positive influence of trade show
characteristics on the probability of trade show attendees visiting the booth and obtaining
product literature.
While the focus of these studies have been on assessing the effectiveness of trade shows in
terms of their ability to create interests and sales leads for exhibited products, many trade
shows serve as a venue for firms to showcase their innovations, which include demonstration
of items that are not yet ready for sale. Indeed, many trade shows demonstrate product
concepts, which have to go through several product development hurdles before being ready
for commercial introduction. For instance, concepts of Sony’s PlayStation and Nintendo’s
Wii were demonstrated in trade shows (e.g., Tokyo Game Show) several years prior to their
actual launch. In the 2008 Chicago Auto Show, Honda revealed its Honda CR-Z concept for
a new sports hybrid, the kinds of which never existed in the line of Honda automobiles.
A feature of product concepts demonstrations is the long lag time between the initial
demonstration of a concept and its actual launch, and the consequent uncertainty about
whether a concept will be developed and commercialized at all. Therefore, it is difficult to
assess the contemporaneous effects of concept demonstrations via commonly used marketing
metrics such as sales leads or actual sales. Still, the concepts demonstrated signal to the
external world the innovativeness of firms as well as new product pipelines with revenue potentials. Thus, the effects of concept demonstrations are better assessed with metrics such as
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stock returns, which accounts for long term return prospects, as well as the risks. Abnormal
stock returns have been used by marketing scholars to measure the followings: the effects
of actual new product introductions (Kelm, Narayanan, and Pinches 1995), the announcements of imminent new product introductions (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991), and
new product preannouncements (Shrinivasan et al. 2007; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha
2007).
The objective of this paper is to assess the effects of concept demonstration in trade shows
in order to examine its effects on firm value and risks. I frame the investigation as a two-stage
process – when the firm decides on the number of concepts to demonstrate and when the
investors react to the concepts demonstrated by a firm which is reflected in its stock return.
There are at least four unique features of this study that are not present in prior studies on
the effects of product introductions and preannouncements. First, because of the space limit
in a trade show, firms have to judiciously determine the concept mix, perhaps allocating
space to more innovative concepts than to concepts with minor changes. Second, in placing
the concepts in a trade show to signal innovativeness, firms are mindful of their credibility
(e.g., their past records of converting their concepts to commercial products). Third, trade
shows are a venue where all firms demonstrate their concepts, producing a competitive effect
in which firms may try to out – do each other with the number of concepts. Finally, in a
trade show, a firm may demonstrate concepts for the first time (hereafter “debut”), concepts
that have been demonstrated in prior auto shows (hereafter “concept”), as well products
that are ready to sell. This mix may impact investors differently.

1.2.1

Research Questions

I. Why do firms demonstrate their product concepts in trade shows?
II. What are the rewards of the first-time concept demonstration?
III. What other factors of product concept demonstration affect the firm value and risks?
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Inter-temporal Pricing Strategy with PCD

Product concept demonstrations in trade shows would not only generate buzz for the new
concept which will be launched soon (especially in the durable goods category) but would
also encourage some consumers to wait for the new model instead of purchasing a currently
available model without delay. The below article published in Motor Trend on April 2012
describes well what kinds of information is revealed by the concept demonstration at the
trade shows:
“... The next-generation Santa Fe would be unveiled at the New York auto show.
... Hyundai expects front-drive Santa Fe Sports equipped with the 2.4-liter I-4 to
achieve 23/33 miles per gallon (mpg) city/highway, and front-drive turbo models
to get 23/31 mpg. ...Pricing hasn’t yet been announced, but expect the 2013
Santa Fe Sport to start around $25,000, and the 2013 Santa Fe to carry a base
price closer to $30,000. ...As for styling, the Santa Fe and Santa Fe Sport wear
Hyundai’s new ”Storm Edge” design language. Up front, both Santa Fe models
feature Hyundai’s large trapezoidal chrome grille with three bars on the Santa
Fe Sport and four bars on the Santa Fe.” (Seabaugh 2012)
Information about quality (e.g., fuel efficiency, safety rate, engine specification), design,
introduction schedules, and price are distinguished from preannouncement, which only covers
some key features of the attributes and tentative release date. Recently, Mercedes-Benz
revealed Mercedes CLA with premium style and budget price:
“This car is a little smaller than the C-Class, a staple of the Mercedes lineup.
With a projected starting price of around $30,000 its also expected to cost a little
less than its stablemate about five grand less. The CLA-Class design borrows
heavily from the CLS as it should. The company is building them both a fourdoor coupes. Mercedes representatives say the cars styling is very emotional,
and it truly makes a bold statement on stage. Its side glass, also known as the
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“daylight opening, or DLO for short looks like it was pulled directly from the
CLS, at about three-fifths scale. Interestingly, that design isnt just for looks. The
CLA-Class positively slices through the air. Its coefficient of drag is a claimed
0.22, which Mercedes says is the best for any production car. As for the mechanicals, the only powertrain mentioned at the unveiling was a 208 horsepower,
turbocharged 2.0-liter, four-cylinder engine with 258 lb-ft of torque. It should be
matched to a seven-speed dual-clutch automatic transmission for lightening-fast
shifts. All-wheel drive will be offered. The companys latest 4MATIC system was
tailor made for front-wheel-drive applications and it supposedly tips the scales
at a featherweight 70 kilograms, about 155 pounds. If you were hoping to get
a glimpse of the brand-new Mercedes-Benz CLA-Class in Detroit, heres a bit of
bad news. The car will not be shown in COBO hall. Its official revealing will be
at the Geneva Motor Show in March.” (Cole 2013)
Mercedes-Benz revealed not only the product information such as the design angle but also
quality information including the approximate starting price. This type of market behavior
distinguishes itself from a preannouncement that only releases some key numbers of the
attributes and expected launching schedule.
Why do consumers delay purchasing a new product? One explanation is that the new
model is more attractive than the current one because of either improved quality or new
design. An alternative explanation is that the new model may be the better deal than
the old model based on the ratio of valuation to price. In Chapter 3, I present a game
theoretic model of inter-temporal pricing allowing the monopolist to demonstrate the new
model in a trade show before launch. The firm has incentives to utilize these trade shows to
maximize profits coming from expected sales by demonstrating a product concept. I capture
many aspects of product information revealed at trade shows in two dimensions; vertical
differentiation and horizontal differentiation. For example, milage per gasoline (MPG) is a
good proxy to measure quality improvements; therefore, one can capture how new model is
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vertically differentiated from the old model by comparing MPG. On the other hand, a change
in style is an example of horizontally differentiation from the old model. Also, I notice that
price information will be revealed so that potential consumers for the new model can evaluate
two options: either buy the current model or wait and buy the new model. The main idea
of this paper is to address these questions: What is more likely to influence consumers to
wait for the new model, superior quality or brand new design of the new model? Which
conditions can guarantee that the firm achieves positive profits when demonstrating a new
concept model?

1.3.1

Illustrative Examples

I start my discussion with a numerical illustration shown in Table 1.1 (constructed using the
theoretical model developed later). In the first example, the firm demonstrates the quality
upgraded concept model in a trade show with the firm charges new model price ($44,636),
which is lower than the old model price ($45,305). According to a consumer survey report,
745 consumers would like to wait for the new model that will be launched in next period
because of the high quality and lower price of the new model, while only 10 consumers
prefer buying the old model in period 1. The consequence is that entire unit sales for both
models are greater than the benchmark case when the firm does not demonstrate the new
concept in the trade show (1,509 1,100 = 409 units) and the net benefit of product concept
demonstration is $6.3 million. (See Case 1 in Table 1.1.)
Now consider what happen when the firm demonstrates a product concept in a trade
show, focusing on new style (Case 2 in Table 1.1). The old model sales would not be
affected by the demonstration of the new model if the new model looks totally different.
Consumer research reveals that the uniqueness of the new model attracts only about 10% of
old model buyers compared to cases without demonstration; however, the new model attracts
979 consumers, including 467 delayed consumers who opted to wait for the new model.
Customers purchase the new model because of the uniqueness and the demand of new model
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Table 1.1: Illustration for the Benefits of Product Concept Demonstration
(1)

(2)

Variables
Price
Sales
Delayed
Purchases
Revenue

Old model
New model
Old model
New model

Period 1
Period 2
Total

(3)

(4)

Case 1
Quality Upgrade
No Demo Demo
$50,000 $45,305
$60,000 $44,636
500
10
600
1,499

(6)

Case 2
New Style
No Demo Demo
$50,000 $50,187
$50,000 $48,745
500
456
500
979

(7)

(8)

Case 3
Almost Same
No Demo Demo
$50,000
$39,721
$50,500
$29,158
500
77
505
1,368

0

745

0

467

0

649

$25.0M
$36.0M
$61.0M

$.5M
$66.9M
$67.4M

$25.0M
$25.0M
$50.0M

$22.9M
$47.7M
$70.6M

$25.0M
$25.5M
$50.0M

$3.1M
$39.9M
$42.9M

Net benefit
of PCDa
a

(5)

$6.3M

$20.6M

−$7.6M

PCD denotes a product concept demonstration.

doubles in comparison when no demonstration occurs. As a result of demonstrating new
style new model, the firm earns $20.6 million of net benefits compared to no demonstration.
The third case in Table 1.1 is when the firm demonstrates concepts in the new model
that are similar to the old model. In other words, quality has been improved in the new
model but major parts are still the same or the style has been changed with only minor
updates. The best strategy of the firm is to drop the new model price drastically to attract
as many consumers as possible in the second period. The consequence of demonstrating
the new model is the shrinkage of the old model demand; therefore, the total profit is also
decreased. Even though the total sales increased due to the new model sales, new model
profit margin is too small. Hence, the net benefit of demonstrating new model with only
minor updates is the loss of $7.6 million.
My analysis provides new insights into the interplay of product positioning and product
concept demonstration that induces varying degrees of purchase delay while shaping the
firms dynamic pricing strategy. Interestingly, I find that product concept demonstration
can decrease the new product price compared to the case without a demonstration, and
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the amount of delayed purchases induced by the product concept demonstration is greatest
at very low or high levels of product substitutability, exhibiting a U-shaped pattern. My
results indicate that engaging in pre-launch product concept demonstration is not always
the optimal strategy for the monopolistic firm.

1.3.2

Research Questions

I. How do product concept demonstrations affect the firm’s inter-temporal pricing strategy?
II. What are the underlying strategic forces that shape the optimal pricing strategy for old
and new models?

Chapter 2
Effects of PCD on Firm Value & Risks
2.1

Literature Review

Guided by the commonly held view that new products are a significant driver of corporate
growth, several researchers have attempted to empirically validate whether information about
firm innovations indeed increase firm value. Placed on a time line when the information is
available to public relative to the actual new product introduction, these studies range from
R&D project announcements, to preannouncements of new products, to announcements of
new product introductions. The review of the literature is organized as such.

2.1.1

R&D Projects and Innovation Stages

Effects of R&D and innovation project announcements are found to depend on the stage of
the innovation (Kelm, Narayanan, and Pinches 1995; Sood and Tellis 2009) and the technology orientation of the firm (Chan, Martin, and Kensinger 1990). Kelm, Narayanan, and
Pinches (1995) find that announcements about projects undertaken at the early phase of
the product development (e.g., finding a technical solution to a problem) have positive effect
on stocks, but the effect is restricted to the firms with technological capabilities. For other

11
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firms, investors wait for information about the product introductions before reacting positively. Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990) find that high-technology firms that announce
increase in R&D spending experience positive abnormal returns, when a high-technology
firm increases its R&D expenditures. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) find that
high ratio of R&D to equity leads to large excess returns.

2.1.2

New Product Preannouncements

This stream of literature typically examines the benefits and pitfalls of new product preannouncements. Some of the main benefits of preannouncements include: (1) creating entry
barrier and preempting competition for dominant firms with low cost of product development (Bayus, Jain, and Rao 2001), (2) alerting consumers so they wait for the impending
release of a new product (Eliashberg and Robertson 1988; Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995),
and (3) creating dominant standard in an industry with competing technologies or formats
(Farrell and Saloner 1986). The negative effects of product preannouncements include alerting competitors (Robertson, Eliashberg, and Rymon 1995), and the firm introducing the
product either later than what was promised or never at all (Hendricks and Singhal 1997),
phenomenon commonly termed as a “vaporware.”
Research on the effects of new product preannouncements on firm value is limited. Mishra
and Bhabra (2002) find weak positive effects. In a more comprehensive study, Sorescu,
Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007) utilize a market signaling framework (Spence 1974) and
demonstrate that new product preannouncements signals the market about future earning
potentials, thereby positively impacting the firm value. The effect is stronger when the information about preannouncement is specific, when the information is updated, and when
the credibility of the firm is high. In summary, positive effects of innovations on firm value
are not restricted only to actual new product introductions, but are also present in cases of
announcements of R&D investment and innovations stages, as well as new product preannouncements.
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Announcement of New Product Introductions

Early studies, using small samples and weekly stock returns, find marginal or no effect of new
products announcements on stock returns (Eddy and Saunders 1980). In a more comprehensive analysis involving 24 industries, 336 firms, and 1,348 new products, Chaney, Devinney,
and Winer (1991) find negative effect of the number of introduction announcements on cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 11 of the industries indicating that the fewer, rather than
many, introductions of new product raises firm valuations. Focusing on 66 publicly traded
pharmaceutical firms, introducing 3891 new products (including 255 breakthrough drugs)
during a period of 1991-2000, Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu (2003) find that technological
and market breakthrough new products have positive impacts on firm values.
In the automobile industry, Pauwels et al. (2004) find that introductions of new automobiles increase firm values, especially if the new products enter a new market. The firm
value is found to grow as more information about the new products become available. Using
data for 20,000 new consumer packaged goods products, Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) find
that breakthrough new products add to firm value as well as risks.

2.1.4

Return versus Risks

Potential return associated with R&D investments and new product initiatives is likely associated with firm-specific (i.e., idiosyncratic) risks manifested by return volatility (Merton
1987; Ghysels et al. 2005). Tirole (1988) however argues that breakthrough innovations are
so unique that demonstrating firm can achieve monopolistic share due to patents or because
they are differentiated, hence it is difficult to imitate. When the innovative products are
launched and adopted, they presumably increase the predictability of future cash flows because there is no close competitor which launches substitutes. Contrary to Tirole (1988),
Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) find that high ratio of R&D to equity raises volatility of the firm returns. Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu (2003) find that the positive effect of
technological breakthrough on firm values is associated with greater idiosyncratic risk than
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market breakthroughs. Similarly, Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) find that breakthrough new
products add to firm risks. In summary, past research shows that information about innovation projects, new product preannouncements, and actual launch generally have a positive
effect on firm returns and idiosyncratic risk. A gap in this research stream is that it has not
considered situations where multiple firms displays several of their new products at different
stages of development in the same location. Trade shows offer such a context. While trade
shows have similar characteristics as product/project announcements or preannouncements,
there are significant differences. First, firms can demonstrate multiple concepts and the concept mix in a trade show. Second, trade shows offer opportunities for visual inspections and
sometimes physical experience of the concept and prototypes. These experiences offer information about the nature of innovation and also readiness of the product to be commercially
introduced. Third, concept demonstrations in a trade show take place in a venue where other
competing firms also demonstrate their concepts. Finally, like product preannouncements,
a firm’s prior history in converting a concept into a commercial vehicle in a timely manner
indicates the credibility of the firm to follow through on its promise. These features are
incorporated in Figure 2.1, which serves as a conceptual framework for guiding this research.

2.2

Conceptual Frameworks

Since much of corporate innovations take place within the confines of a firm, there is information asymmetry between investors and the firm. Through their product demonstrations in
trade shows, firms therefore signal the market about incremental cash flow potential from the
new products converted from the concepts demonstrated (Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha
2007). The signaling effort includes: (1) conveying information about the innovativeness of
the concepts demonstrated, (2) establishing credibility of the firm to convert the concepts
into commercial products, and (3) using influential trade shows as venues to communicate
information about firm innovations.
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Concept Innovativeness

In a trade show a firm can display multiple concepts with different degree of innovativeness.
Some concepts may entail new-to-the-world technology (e.g., Prius gasoline-electric hybrid
engine, Volt electric car concept, or interactive video game consoles by Nintendo Wii), others
may involve significant design changes (e.g., the boxy design of Scion by Nissan, the retro
redesign of Ford Mustang, or Fiat 500 mini cars redesigned For Two, etc.), and yet other
entail small improvements (e.g., a styling change of previous years model, e.g., grill redesigns,
headlight or fender contours, etc.). As discussed before, relative to incremental new products,
breakthrough or radical new products are found have to have greater positive effect on firm
value (Chaney, Devinney, and Winer 1991; Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu 2003; Soreuscu
and Spanjol 2008). Thus, concepts with significant technological innovations will be viewed
by investors more positively than those demonstrating concepts incremental innovations.
H1 Concepts that employ new technologies or significant design changes will have greater
positive effect on firm value than will concepts with minor incremental improvements.
There are also certain firm-specific factors that may enhance or limit a firms ability to
signal its innovativeness to the public. In the context of concept demonstration, a firm
that invest more in R&D should have more new product concepts in their product pipelines
(Chan, Martin, Kensinger 1990). However, firms may have their own internal innovation
strategies that place different emphasis on different types of innovation (i.e., breakthrough
versus incremental) (Kelm, Narayanan, and Pinches 1995). Firms may also employ different
strategies of disclosing their innovation to the public in trade shows. Some firms hold their
new product concepts a secret while others are more generous in disclosing their innovative
activities.1
1

While a firms R&D investments are public information, the internal strategies are not observable. I
incorporate firm fixed effects to account for this unobserved heterogeneity in such strategies.
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Concept Conversion History

Since concept demonstrations in a trade show also serve as a concept screening function, only
a proportion of demonstrated concept is pursued further. Even those that survive may not
meet the technical, manufacturing, or commercial targets. Thus, for demonstrated concepts
to positively influence firm value, the firm must credibly convince investors its ability to
convert the concepts into marketable product. Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha (2007) find
that firms who are more reliable in delivering a preannounced product reap greater return
from providing updates about the status of preannounced products.
H2 Firms with better history of converting concepts to commercial products will have a
stronger positive effect of concept demonstrations on firm value.

2.2.3

Trade Show Size

For the firm to effectively communicate its new product activities to the public, it should
select the right venue to do so same way firms select media outlets. Larger trade shows bring
in prominent industry analysts, have more room for display a wide range of new products,
and attract more firms to show case their new products for greater visibility. As competing
firms vies for attention of the visitors, firms are fearful that their concepts may be crowded
out. Thus, firms are likely to display more concepts to counter the competitive effects as
well as to capitalize on the buzz that bigger trade shows generate. Thus, larger trade shows
should have stronger impact on firm value than venues that accommodate fewer display
items.
H3 The bigger the trade shows in which firms demonstrate their concepts, the stronger will
be the effect of concept demonstration on firm value.
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Trade Show Display Mix

Firms participate in a trade show not only to present their early stage innovations to the
public but also to create interest in their production ready products. Some of the concepts
are revealed to the world for the first time (hereafter, the “debuts), while others have been
shown before in prior trade shows (hereafter, the “concepts). Finance theory suggests that
stock price reflects all publicly available information (Campbell, Lo, MacKinlay 1997). Thus
in assessing firm value and idiosyncratic risk, investors consider only new information. In the
current context, only the debuts should be a relevant input to the assessment of firm value.
However, because the debuts are subject to considerable product development and market
risk, the positive effect of demonstrating concepts for the first time is associated with larger
volatility of returns, i.e., idiosyncratic risk. Also, since the debuts demonstrated in a trade
show are a mix of technological break-through concepts and incremental improvement, the
variability in the mix adds to the assessment of future cash flows, and therefore, firm value.
Finally, previously demonstrated concepts and product-ready new products are already a
part of public information, and therefore, should not influence firm value. The following
hypothesis encapsulates these assertions:
H4 (a) positively influenced by the number of debuts (concepts demonstrated for the first
time), (b) negatively by the variability in the types (i.e., breakthroughs versus incremental) of debuts demonstrated, and (c) not influenced by previously demonstrated
concepts and production ready new products.
H5 Firm idiosyncratic risk will be (a) positively influenced by the number of debuts demonstrated, (b) positively by the variability in the types of debuts demonstrated, and (c)
unaffected by previously demonstrated concepts and production ready new products.
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Figure 2.1: A Conceptual Concept
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Method
Research Context

As noted before, I utilize auto shows as a context for the study. Auto shows are a popular
form of trade shows, in which world’s leading automakers showcase their innovative activities to the world. The popularity of auto shows among industry experts, media, financial
analysts, as well “regular” consumers has grown exponentially over the years. For instance,
since its inauguration in 1901, Chicago Auto Show expanded its attendance from a meager
2000 to 6000 to anywhere between a half to a three quarter of a million people in recently
concluded auto show in 2008, a ten-day event covering 1.3 million square feet of space.
Detroit Auto Show attracted an estimated about 700,000 visitors, including auto experts,
industry analysts, and celebrities. The largest attended auto show, New York Auto Show
has more than 1 million visitors per year and it generates nearly $250 million in economic
impact for New York City. A March 17, 1996 New York Times story indicates that just the
rental cost for New York auto show is about $1.9 million, and GM, Ford and Chrysler each
spent an additional $1.6 million to produce the auto show. Costs for auto shows account
for a big part of the promotional budget of auto companies. Products demonstrated in an
auto show can be broadly divided in two groups: production-ready vehicles and automobile
concepts. Production vehicles are expected to be available at the dealers’ lots during the
current model year. Trade shows offers a convenient means for buyers in the market for a
new product to compare different production ready products. Dealers and distributors often
play a significant role and providing sales and marketing support for these products in the
hope of potential sales. Unlike production ready products, which are typically managed by
marketing and sales personnel, the demonstration of concepts is a domain of the designers,
primarily interested in demonstrating the technical aspects of the products. Also, unlike
production ready products, which are to be introduced during the same year, concepts are
subject to considerable product development risks, and some concept demonstrated in an
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auto show are never commercialized.
I focus on three U.S. automakers (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) and three Japanese automakers (Toyota, Honda, and Nissan). Collectively, these six automakers account for 87%
of the United States automotive market. I included all production-ready cars and concepts
demonstrated by these firms in all the major auto shows (e.g., Chicago, Detroit, New York,
Frankfurt, Tokyo, etc.) during the 2002-07 period. As Table 2.1 indicates, the six automakers demonstrated, on average, about thirteen concept cars each. Also, the number
of concepts demonstrated by the US automakers is significantly higher than those demonstrated by Japanese automakers. The concepts demonstrated differ on the degree of their
innovativeness.

2.3.2

Event Study

I use an event study methodology to compute the cumulative abnormal stock return for
the six automobile manufacturing firms over time windows focused on the before and after
days of auto show. As discussed earlier, a number of researchers in marketing have utilized
event study to assess the long term effects of marketing actions on firm value, especially
when the effects are not contemporaneous to these actions (e.g., see Chaney, Devinney, and
Winer 1991; Tellis and Johnson 2007; Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). Event study
measures the effect of new information released on the market value of a firm’s stock price.
This approach depends on the assumption that the financial markets are efficient, that is,
stock prices reflect all available relevant information in the market (Fama 1970, 1998). Hence,
only new or unanticipated events will change the stock prices affecting the future prospects
of the firm. It also implies that the speed with which new information is incorporated into
prices is instantaneous and the magnitude of the price change is a measure of the value of
this information (Brown and Warner 1985). When an event occurs (for example, when a
new product concept demonstrated), investors update their expectations about the firm’s
future cash flow and risks, and react by buying or selling the shares of firm will be affected
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by the event. The daily return in the stock price between day t − 1 and day t is:

Ri,t =

Pi,t − Pi,t−1 + Di,t
Pi,t−1

(2.1)

where Pit is the closing stock price of firm i at the end of trading day t, Dit is dividend at
time t, and Rit captures the market’s expectations of the long-term impact of all relevant
information that are known between t − 1 and t.
To calculate abnormal returns, I use Fama-French three-factor model which includes
market capitalization, firm size, market value (Fama and French 1993), to which I add price
momentum (Carhart 1997), making it a four-factor model:

Ri,t − Rf t = αi + β1i (Rmt − Rf t ) + β2i SM Bt + β3i HM Lt + β4i U M Dt + εit

(2.2)

ARit = Ri,t − Rf t − [α̂i + β̂1i (Rmt − Rf t ) + β̂2i SM Bt + β̂3i HM Lt + β̂4i U M Dt ]

(2.3)

where
t : Subscript for day of the estimation window i.e. −300 ≤ t ≤ −31
i : Subscript for automobile manufacturing firm
Rit : Stock returns on event i on day t
Rmt : Market rate of return, the average return of the New York Stock Exchange
Rf t : Theoretical rate of return attributed to a risk-free investment
SMB : The difference between the rate of returns of small and large stocks
HML : The difference in returns between high and low book-to-market stocks
UMD : A momentum factor, the difference in the returns of firms between high and low
prior stock performances
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Hypothesis of efficient markets implies that the abnormal return is a random variable with
mean of zero, since the deviations between the actual returns to asset i and their expected
values, conditional on all available information at time (t-1), should be zero systematically.
To test if abnormal returns resulted due to an event, test the hypothesis that the crosssectional mean of abnormal return at the event day is different from zero. As I notice that
in every auto show, events of product concept demonstration are clustered in the calendar
time. This cross-sectional dependence in the abnormal returns generates downward bias
of standard deviation estimate thus inflating the test statistics (Jeffe 1974). Hence, I use
portfolio method for correcting downward bias of standard deviation estimate (See Equation
2.6 and 2.7 below). This accounts for the correlation between residuals of different securities.
I calculate average cumulative abnormal return and the t-statistic (Brown and Warner 1985)
for portfolio of securities as follows:

CARit =

N
X

ARit

(2.4)

i=1

N
1 X
ACARt =
ARit
N i=1

t.stats =

ACARt
=q
SD(ACARt )

1
1
(T −1) N

ACARt
P−31
∗ 2
t=−300 (ACARt − A )

−31 X
N
X
1
A =
ARit
270N t=−300 i=1
∗

(2.5)

(2.6)

(2.7)

where CARit is cumulative abnormal return. ACARt is average cumulative abnormal return
for an event, the average value of the summation of the abnormal return from event time
t0 , the first day of the event window and tn , the last day of the event window (see Figure
2). Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal return, ACARt has a zero mean and standard
deviation of σACAR . T is the days for estimation window that begins from -300 day to -31
day, i.e. 270 days. N is the days of event windows, e.g. N=2 for (0,+1). As discussed later,
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Figure 2.2: Time Line for an Event Study

Estimation Window

-300

Event Window




-31

-1 0 +1

-

t

6

Event

I try several event windows, and pick the window that gives us the best model fit.

2.4

Data

The data come from two different sources. For auto show data, I use “From concepts to
production,” at http://www.conceptcarz.com/. For firms’ stock prices, I utilize Wharton
Research Data Services, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The CRSP is a
value weighted index that is used as the proxy for the market when estimating alpha and
beta in the one factor market model. Total observations are 228 information release events
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Firms
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Number of Debut

(%)

Number of Concept

(%)

Chrysler
Ford
GM
Honda
Toyota
Nissan

38
42
66
15
23
27

18.0
20.0
31.7
7.1
10.9
12.8

90
73
121
53
57
34

21.0
17.1
28.3
12.4
13.3
7.9

Total

211

100

428

100

Firms

Table 2.2: Brands for Each Company
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Chrysler

Ford

GM

Honda

Toyota

Nissan

Chrysler
Dodge
Jeep

Ford
Buick
Lincoln Chevrolet
Cardilac
GMC
Hummer
Pontiac
Saturn

Acura Lexus
Honda Toyota

Infiniti
Nissan

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics: Auto Shows
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Number of Debut

(%)

Number of Concept

(%)

Observations

Detroit
New York
Chicago
LA
Geneva
Frankfurt
Tokyo
SEMA

64
35
16
9
9
9
19
50

30.3
16.6
7.6
4.3
4.3
4.3
9.0
23.7

102
108
125
43
16
4
18
12

23.8
25.2
29.2
10.0
3.8
0.9
4.2
2.8

36
36
36
36
30
18
18
18

Total

211

100

428

100

228

Auto Shows

CHAPTER 2. EFFECTS OF PCD ON FIRM VALUE & RISKS

25

Table 2.4: Cross Tabulation between Firms and Auto Shows
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Chrysler

Ford

GM

Honda

Toyota

Nissan

Total

Detroit
New York
Chicago
LA
Frankfurt
Geneva
Tokyo
SEMA

19
3
2
1
2
3
2
6

14
6
3
2
3
1
1
12

15
11
7
4
0
1
0
28

3
4
0
2
1
1
2
2

6
4
1
0
2
2
6
2

7
7
3
0
1
1
8
2

64
35
16
9
9
9
19
50

Total

38

42

66

15

23

27

211

(i.e., 48 auto shows 6 firms = 228) that includes data for six automobile firms and 38 auto
shows for 5 years from Jan 6, 2002 Detroit Auto Show to Nov 16, 2007 LA Auto Show.
I summarize brands of the company in Table 2. Eight auto shows are Chicago, Detroit,
Frankfurt, Geneva, LA, New York, Specialty Equipment Market Association (SEMA), and
Tokyo auto show. I exclude auto shows where no concept debut is demonstrated. I include
six automakers Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Toyota, and Nissan, which cover 87% of total
U.S. automobile market share. I report the descriptive statistics of six firms and auto shows
in Table 2.1 and Table 2.3.

2.4.1

Cross Tabulation of Debut

In Table 2.4, I present a cross-tabulation of the number of debut between firms and auto
shows. Three US auto makers demonstrate more number of debut in major three auto
shows (e.g., Detroit, New York, and Chicago) than the three Japanese auto makers do. GM
demonstrated the smallest number of debut at auto shows held outside of US among the
three US firms and Honda demonstrated the smallest number of debut at auto shows held
outside of US among the three Japanese firms.
I have the two sets of firm specific data: R&D Intensity and Firm Size. Both firm specific
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data sets are measured by quarterly and I transform quarterly data to the daily data using a
decaying model that the closer date gets the higher expenditure to expend. R&D Intensity
is ratio of R&D expenditure and sales of firm and Firm Size measures total sales of firm.
Other dependent variables are risk measures; systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk. I use
daily stock market index data to compute firm i’s systematic risk measure βi for a period
by using four factor model (Carhart 1997) and I obtain the idiosyncratic risk by calculating
the standard deviation of residuals from Equation. First I measure idiosyncratic risk with
several windows such as only event date (0,0), two days (0,+1), three days (-1,+1), five days
(-2,+2), two weeks (-5, +5), and one month (-10, +10).

2.4.2

Variable Operationalization

I quantify the description with photos of each concept demonstrated in auto shows into three
innovation types: new technology, new design change, and incremental change (See Table
2.5). As Shrinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-Risso, and Hanssens (2007) classified the extent of innovation, I modify an innovation scale ranging three categories for parsimonious classification
as follows; (1) mere trimming, styling and design changes (levels 1 and 2 of J.D. Power and
Association(JDPA) specialist scale), (2) ‘design’ and ‘new benefit’ innovations (levels 3 and
4), and (3) brand entry in a new category (level 5) in the empirical analysis. First, I only
consider a concept as technology that is pioneering innovation such as Toyota’s “Prius”,
electric car. Next type is design change that concept demonstrated is focused on new or
updated design. Third, introduction type is that the purpose of the concept demonstration
is pre-launched advertising the model. Fine-tuned design especially inside of the model can
be found in this type.
In addition to the two sets of concept classifications, I create two firm-specific variables
for the signal strength of the concept debut; introduction ratio and average time to launch.
First, introduction rate is defined as the ratio of eventually launched concept debut and
all demonstrated concept debut. This implies that the high introduction rate, the stronger
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Table 2.5: Classification of Concept: Concept Focus
Concept Focus

Example in recent auto shows

Technology: The objective is to
demonstrate a concept that contains one or more feature(s) that
is (are) available for the first time
ever. For example, first incorporation of anti-brake, traction control, passenger side air bag, etc.

2006 Toyota Fine-X: “...on-the-spot 180-degree rotation, afforded by the combination of four-wheel
independent drive, four-wheel independent steering and a large-steering-angle, and steering mechanism with electric in-wheel motors housed in each
of the four wheels.”

Design Change(s): The objective is to demonstrate changes in
interior and/or exterior designs,
and the resultant improvement of
functionality of the driver and
passengers. Typically, the design
changes involve reconfigurations
of doors, windows, seats, etc.

2007 Nissan Bevel Utility Wagon: “...features an
asymmetrical exterior with a long driver’s side
door which pivots on a special hinge designed for
ease of entry and exit. On the passenger side of the
Nissan Bevel’s body are two doors, with the rear
door hinged at the rear to provide an exceptionally wide door opening... The interior of the Nissan
Bevel is organized into three specific zones. The
first zone is the comfort zone (driver’s area). The
second interior zone of the Nissan Bevel concept
is the “command central” information/technology
zone... The third Bevel zone is the utility/pet
zone.”

Minor Change(s): The objective is to demonstrate production ready concepts and announce short-term direction of
the brand(s). Frequently, next
generation concept(s) of existing
model is(are) present as commercial car.

2006 Infiniti Coupe concept:“... Among the Coupe
Concept’s exterior design features are a full-length
glass panel roof, modulated front fenders and
hood, deep front spoiler and large projector headlights, polished bare metal-look paint, compact
camera outside rearview mirrors, hidden door handles and large 20-inch, 9-spoke painted aluminumalloy wheels. The Coupe Concept interior combines a performance-inspired cockpit with a luxurious passengers’ space featuring a ’double wave’
instrument panel design, with large, violet-color
gauge illumination and a dramatic, full-length center console.”

27
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signal for each concept debut of the firm in the year. I measure the introduction ratio
auto show basis with firm specific so that in every auto show, each firm has own value of
introduction rate. Second, Thus in each auto show each firm has one measure of introduction
rate.

2.5

Models

In this section, I present three models to estimate the effects of product concept demonstrations in auto shows on abnormal stock returns. First, I run a cross-sectional regression model
to show the basic results. To consider an endogeneity issue between firm’s choice of demonstrated debuts and concepts I conduct test for endogeneity and develop a three-stage least
square model. Another 3SLS model with new variable definition is developed and estimated
as well. Finally, simple models for the two risk measures are also modeled.

2.5.1

Initial Model (No Endogeneity Considered)

My initial model is a cross-sectional ordinary lease square regression model that the average
cumulative abnormal return is regressed on all of the independent variables. In this model,
I do not consider possible endogenous variable issues.

ACARij01 = ω0 + ω1 T ech.Dij + +ω2 Design.Dij + ω3 M inor.Change.Dij

(2.8)

+ ω4 Intro.Ratio.Dij + ω5 T ech.Cij + ω6 Design.Cij + ω7 M inor.Change.Cij
+ ω8 Intro.Ratio.Cij + ω9 V ar.Debutsij + ω10 Current.M odelij + ω11 R&Dij
+ ω12 F irm.Dummyi + εIij

where
ACARij01 : average cumulative abnormal return of firm i on auto show j on the event
window (0,+1) day.
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T ech.Dij : the number of debuts focusing on technology innovation of firm i on auto show
j.
Design.Dij : the number of debuts focusing on design updates or incremental innovation
of firm i on auto show j.
M inor.Change.Dij : the number of debuts focusing on minor updates of firm i on auto
show j.
T ech.Cij : the number of concepts focusing on technology innovation of firm i on auto show
j.
Design.Cij : the number of concepts focusing on design updates or incremental innovation
of firm i on auto show j.
M inor.Change.Cij : the number of concepts focusing on minor updates of firm i on auto
show j.
Intro.Ratio.Dij : introduction ratio of debuts for firm i on auto show j.
Intro.Ratio.Cij : introduction ratio of concepts for firm i on auto show j.
V ar.Debutsij : the variance of the number of debuts of firm i on auto show j based on five
recent demonstrations including current one.
Current.M odelij : the number of current model demonstrated of firm i, available in the
market at the time of auto show j.
T otal.Debutj : the total number of debuts demonstrated on auto show j.
R&Dij : decaying estimation of yearly R&D intensity of firm i on auto show j.
F irm.Dummyi : Firm specific dummy. Nissan is the baseline firm.
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ω’s are coefficients to be estimated and, εIij is the error term. R&D intensity is an instrumental variable to capture the degree of firms’ willingness to invest on new projects.
Intro.Ratio.Dij (Intro.Ratioij ) shows the firm’s past historical momentum of concept conversion rate for a debut (a concept) as a backward-looking variable. Total debut (concept)
stands for the venue effect that the larger generates the greater impact on the firm values
from the demonstrating their product concepts. F irm.Dummyi capture the fixed effect of
firm specific differences, especially breath of the product line.

2.5.2

Reduced Form Equation Model

To interpret the coefficients of three-stage least square (3SLS) model, I run ordinary least
square (OLS) regression model in which ACAR01 is regressed on all of the independent
variables including an endogenous variable (e.g., the number of debut). As a result, we have
a merged equation (Equation (2.9)) from Equation (2.13) and (2.14).

ACARij01 = α0 + α1 (γ0 + γ1 T ech.Dij + γ2 Design.Dij + γ3 Intro.Ratio.Dij

(2.9)

+γ4 T otal.Debutj + γ5 R&Dij + γ6 F irm.Dummyi + ε2ij )
+α2 V ar.Debutsij + α3 Conceptij + α4 Current.M odelij + ε1ij

After rearrangement, we get (2.10).

ACARij01 = α0 + α1 γ0 + α1 γ1 T ech.Dij + α1 γ2 Design.Dij + α1 γ3 Intro.Ratio.Dij (2.10)
+α1 γ4 T otal.Debutj + α1 γ5 R&Dij + α1 γ6 F irm.Dummyi
+α2 V ar.Debutsij + α3 Conceptij + α4 Current.M odelij + α1 ε2ij + ε1ij

α’s and γ’s are coefficients to be estimated and, ε1ij is an error term.
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Test for Endogeneity

I conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to confirm if there is an endogeneity issue in the system
of equations. First, I run OLS regression model to predict a residual (ε2ij ) in Equation (2.14).
Second, I estimate the main equation (Equation (2.13)) including the estimated residual
ε̂2ij as an additional independent variable. If the coefficient of this estimated residual is
significant, then the significant explanatory power of the estimated residual confirms that
there is an endogeneity issue.

Debutsij = η0 + η1 T ech.Dij + η2 Design.Dij + η3 M inor.Change.Dij

(2.11)

+ η4 Intro.Ratio.Dij + η5 R&Dij + 1

ACARij01 = ξ0 + ξ1 Debutsij + ξ2 V ar.Debutsij + ξ3 Conceptij + ξ4 Current.M odelij + ξ5 ˆ1 + 2
(2.12)
where
Debutsij : the number of the first time demonstrated concept debuts of firm i on auto show
j.
Conceptsij : the number of the second or more times demonstrated concepts of firm i on
auto show j.

2.5.4

Three-Stage Least Square

I consider that investors react to the information releases available at the auto show, which
includes the debuts, the concepts, and the production ready automobiles that are ready
for sale. I suspect that the number and type of debuts and concepts demonstrated are
endogenously determined by the firms, hence those are unobservable. Since the error terms
among Equation 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15 are correlated because of the firm’s incentive to select
successful product concepts that can generate greater abnormal return, I treat them as a
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system of equations and estimate them via three-stage least squares (3SLS). Hence, I have the
following models: an abnormal return model with only decision variables of demonstrations
such as the number of debuts, variance of debut, the number of concept, and the number
of current model. The two dependent variables, the number of debut and the number of
concept are fitted exogenous variables and control variables. Therefore I run three-stage
least square model to estimate the effects of product concept demonstrations on firm value.

ACARij01 = α0 + α1 Debutsij + α2 V ar.Debutsij + α3 Conceptij + α4 Current.M odelij + ε1ij
(2.13)

Debutsij = γ0 + γ1 T ech.Dij + γ2 Design.Dij + γ3 Intro.Ratio.Dij

(2.14)

+ γ4 T otal.Debutj + γ5 R&Dij + γ6 F irm.Dummyi + ε2ij

Conceptsij = δ0 + δ1 T ech.Cij + δ2 Design.Cij + δ3 Intro.Ratio.Dij

(2.15)

+ δ4 T otal.Conceptj + δ5 R&Dij + δ6 F irm.Dummyi + ε3ij

However, the demonstrations of the concepts and the currently available for sales in the
market do not have any unanticipated information at the auto show; therefore, it would not
affect the firm value.

2.5.5

Three-Stage Least Square using New Variable Definitions

I also run the 3SLS with new definitions for the number of debut: Tech Ratio, Design
Change Ratio, Minor Change Ratio. Specifically speaking, Tech Ratio denotes the ratio of
the number of technology-oriented debut and the own number of debut. For illustration,
if the number of technology-oriented debut is 2, and the own number of debut is 5, then
Tech Ratio would be 40%. I only include two variables (e.g.,Tech Ratio and Design Change
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Ratio) because it causes a multicollinearity issue to include the third variable (Minor Change
Debut).

ACARij01 = α10 +α11 Debutsij +α12 V ar.Debutsij +α13 Conceptij +α14 Current.M odelij +ε11ij
(2.16)

Debutsij = γ10 + γ11 T ech.Debut.Ratioij + γ12 Design.Debut.Ratioij

(2.17)

+ γ13 Intro.Ratio.Dij + γ14 T otal.Debutj + γ15 R&Dij + γ16 F irm.Dummyi + ε12ij

Conceptsij = δ10 + δ11 T ech.Ratioij + δ12 Design.Ratioij

(2.18)

+ δ13 Intro.Ratio.Cij + δ14 T otal.Conceptj + δ15 R&Dij + δ16 F irm.Dummyi + ε13ij

2.5.6

Models for Risks

As McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim (2007) showed that advertising and R&D reduce the systematic risk of the firm, I expect that product concept demonstrations also lower the firm’s
systematic risk because product concept demonstrations also have a role of pre-launch advertising. I also run cross-sectional regression model for idiosyncratic risk expecting product
concept demonstrations increase the idiosyncratic risk.

Systematic.Riskij = β0 +β1 Debutsij +β2 V ar.Debutsij +β3 Conceptij +β4 Current.M odelij +ε4ij
(2.19)
Idiosycratic.Riskij = ξ0 +ξ1 Debutsij +ξ2 V ar.Debutsij +ξ3 Conceptij +ξ4 Current.M odelij +ε5ij
(2.20)
Where
Systematic.Riskij : the slope, β1i of the regression equation for the term (Rmt − Rf t ) in
Equation 2.2.
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Idiosycratic.Riskij : standard deviation of error term in the four factor model in Equation
2.3.

2.6

Results

Table 2.6 through Table 2.12 show us the results of the models. First, I select the best
event-window to analyze the effects of product concept demonstration on both firm value
and risks. Next, I present the estimation results for the initial model which does not consider
endogeneity issue. After conducting test for endogeneity, I present reduced-form model, 3SLS
model, and 3SLS model with the new variable definitions.

2.6.1

Selection of Event Window

I first select event window size based on goodness of fit, R-square and Chi-square. In Table
2.6, (0,+1) is the most significant in terms of R-square measure, (-1,+1) has the greatest
Chi-square measure meaning that the model explains the most among the models with the
certain numbers of independent variables. However, (-1,+1) includes the day before event
which is biased by unrevealed facts so I choose (0,+1) as our focus of analysis. As a result,
consistent to the common knowledge in event study, the narrow event window gets the
greater the goodness of fits. Furthermore, consistent coefficient estimations from 3SLS of
the different event windows do validate that our estimation results are stable. Now I discuss
key findings.

2.6.2

Initial Model (No Endogeneity Considered)

Table 2.7 shows the estimation result of initial model. First of all, the coefficient of Tech.Debut
and Desing.Debut are positive and significant (.0117, p<.01 and .0027, p<.05, respectively).
However, the coefficient of Tech.Concept is negative and significant (-.0044, p<.1). This
shows that only unanticipated information release positively affect the firm value through
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Table 2.6: Event Windows
(1)

(2)

(3)

Event Window R2 (%) χ2
(0,0)
(0,+1)
(-1,+1)
(-2,+2)
(-5,+5)
(-10,+10)
a ∗

3.62
4.49
4.15
1.19
2.60
1.91

12.58∗∗ a
19.55∗∗∗
36.36∗∗∗
22.87∗∗∗
12.95∗∗
7.50

(4)
N
228
228
228
228
228
228

p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01

increasing abnormal stock returns of the demonstrating firm. Relatively low R2 indicates a
clue of possible endogeneity issue in this initial model.

2.6.3

Reduced Form Equation Model

In Table 2.8, I present the results for the reduced form regression model. This reduced-form
model also estimate the model assuming that there is no endogeneity issue in the system of
equations. Hence, the results of the model are consistent with the initial model estimations.
Tech.Debut
It is important to note that the effects of the debut classification on abnormal return are
multiplicative form of α and γ in Equation (2.13) and (2.14) (i.e., α1 γ1 is the coefficient of
the number of the technology-oriented debut).

2.6.4

Test Result for Endogeneity

Remember that there is an endogeneity issue if I run cross-sectional regression of cumulative
abnormal returns on all independent variables of marketing actions. After conducting the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity, I confirm that the
error term (ε2ij ) in the first stage model in Equation (2.13) is correlated with the error term
(ε1ij ) in the main model in Equation (2.14). Because firms are likely to choose product
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Table 2.7: Effects of Product Concept Demonstrations on Abnormal Returns: Initial Model
Variables

ACAR(0,+1)

Tech Debut
.0117∗∗∗
Design Debut
.0027∗
Minor Change Debut
.0002
Intro.Ratio.Debut
.0011
Tech
-.0044∗
Design
.0001
Minor Change
-.0003
Intro.Ratio
.0039
Var.Debut
-.0001
Commercial Model
.0002
Total Debut
.0002
R&D Intensity
.0011
Chrysler
-.0062∗
Ford
-.0016
GM
-.0058∗
Honda
-.0019
Toyota
-.0029
Constant
.0014
R2 (%)
14.22
Adj.R2 (%)
7.28
F(13,214)
1.02∗∗∗
N
228.
concepts to demonstrate concepts which will be successful among many product concepts.
In addition, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) shows that there is no multicollinearity issue
in the model. The coefficients of the full model are consistent to those of simple regression
results.

2.6.5

Three-Stage Least Square

First of all, I propose a greater reward of breakthrough innovation meaning that firms that
demonstrate a technology oriented debut will obtain greater positive abnormal returns than
firms that demonstrate a design oriented concept. As I show in second column of Table 2.10,
the coefficient of the Tech Debut is positive, significant (1.1483, p<0.01), and greater than
that of the Design Debut(.8991, p<0.01 for Design debut), which support H1. This result is
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Table 2.8: Effects of Product Concept Demonstrations on Abnormal Returns: Reduced Form
Model
Variables

ACAR(0,+1)

Tech Debut
Design Debut
Intro.Ratio.Debut
Var.Debut
Concept
Commercial Model
Total Debut
R&D Intensity
Chrysler
Ford
GM
Honda
Toyota
Constant
R2 (%)
Adj.R2 (%)
F(13,214)
N

.0107∗∗∗
.0025∗
.0014
-.0001
.0001
.0002
.0002
-.0409
-.0059∗
-.0026
-.0064∗∗
-.0014
-.0040
.0035
12.44
7.13
2.34∗∗∗
228.

consistent with the results from Sorescu and Spanjol (2008).
Second, my model has two different kinds of control variables; firm specific variable and
auto show specific variable. The concept convergence ratio and the size effect of the auto
show are the two backward-looking auto show specific variables. Consistent with H2, I
find that concept convergence rate (or Introduction Ratio) enhance the abnormal return
through the number of product concept demonstration (.9193, p < .01 for Debuts, 1.5309,
p<.01 for Concepts in Table 2.10). This supports the argument that auto maker earns
greater firm values by demonstrating the concept debuts that will have greater probability
to convert into commercial model in an auto show because consumers and investors not only
observe product concept demonstration in the current auto show, but will consider the firm’s
demonstrating momentum from the previous shows or other sources of information from the
media. Therefore, H2 is empirically supported.
Third, the second control variables is the auto show specific variable. The size effect of
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Table 2.9: Test Results for Endogeneity
Variables

ACAR(0,+1)

Debut
Var.Debut
Concept
Commercial Model
ˆ1
Constant
R2 (%)
Adj.R2 (%)
F(5,222)
N

.0028∗∗∗
-.0001
.0002
.0000
-.0050∗∗
.0004
7.06
4.96
3.37∗∗∗
228.

the auto show is one of the two backward-looking auto show specific variables. Consistent
with H3, I find that the size effect of auto show (Total Debut or Total Concept) also increase
the abnormal return (.0737, p<.01 for Debuts, .0544, p<.01 for Concepts in Table 2.10).
This supports the argument that larger trade shows should have stronger impact on firm
value than venues that accommodate fewer display items. Hence, H3 is also empirically
supported.
Next, as I show in the forth column in Table 2.10, the results support H4: (a) the product concept debut demonstration has a strong and significantly positive effect on average
cumulative abnormal returns of demonstrating firm (.0021, p<.01) through auto shows, (b)
the coefficient of the Variance of Debut is negative and significant (-.0003, p<.05 in Table
2.10) which suggest that high variance of debut decreases the effects of product concept
demonstration on the abnormal stock returns. Variance measure captures the consistency
for the quality of concept products offered by the specific firm. Hence, these results suggest that overall product concept demonstrations in trade shows increase firm values of the
demonstrating firm and if it is consistent, then the effect will be greater.
As I discussed before, only first time demonstrations of product concept derive positive
abnormal stock return. However, the estimation of model (the forth column of Table 2.10)
show that the coefficient of the effect of product concept demonstrations on abnormal stock
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Table 2.10: Effects of Product Concept Demonstrations on Abnormal Returns: 3SLS
(1)
Variables
Debut (First time)
Var.Debut
Concept (Previously demonstrated)
Commercial Model
Tech Debut
Design Debut
Intro.Ratio.Debut
Total Debut
R&D Intensity
Tech Concept
Design Concept
Intro.Ratio.Concept
Total Concept
R&D Intensity
Chrysler
Ford
GM
Honda
Toyota
Constant
R2 (%)
χ2
N
a ∗

p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01

(2)

(3)

(4)

Debuts

Concept

ACAR(0,+1)
.0021∗∗∗
-.0003∗∗
-.0011∗∗
.0004∗∗

1.1483∗∗∗
.8991∗∗∗
.9193∗∗∗
.0737∗∗∗
16.1823∗

.3354∗∗
.2764
.1997
-.4084∗∗
-.0139
-.7271∗
88.04
1680.63∗∗∗
228.

.9215∗∗∗
1.0337∗∗∗
1.5309∗∗∗
.0544∗∗∗
-31.5604∗∗∗
.3471∗∗
-.0751
.8366∗∗∗
.4084∗
-.1797
.7607
84.41
1237.94∗∗∗
228.

.0010
5.94
38.95∗∗∗
228.

a

CHAPTER 2. EFFECTS OF PCD ON FIRM VALUE & RISKS

40

return is significantly negative (-.0011, p<.05) suggesting that demonstrating a new product
concept which is already demonstrated before in an auto show does not generate abnormal stock returns for the firm rather decrease the firm values. The negative influence of
demonstrated concepts confirms that only new information release can increase firm value.
According to this result, however, this incremental amount of new information from the
second or third time demonstrated concept model result in negative abnormal stock return.
For the second part of H4c: The production ready new products affect firm value positively
(.0004, p<.05). This positive response of production ready new products shows that if the
demonstrated model is close to be launched, then demonstrating the production ready new
products boosts firm value as well. This result can be explained by public relations or advertising perspectives when firms demonstrate not only futuristic concept but also current
selling car in the auto show in order to have synergic effects of them. This also confirms
that event study is appropriate research method for this kinds of researches. Therefore, H4c
is empirically supported.
Sixth, I propose a positive effect of R&D Intensity on abnormal stock return. As Table
2.10 shows, the coefficient of the R&D Intensity is positive but not significant (16.1823,
p<.10). However, the effects of R&D Intensity of the demonstration for a concept demonstration is significantly negative (-31.5604, p<.01 in Table 2.10.) This suggests that R&D
intensity is usually a good proxy for the positive expectation for the future cash flow increases along the new product development plan, however, if the product concept is either
not promising or too far away from being commercialized or close enough to launch the
model in the market, then R&D intensity could not be valid information to estimate the
future cash flows from demonstration.
Last, the other group of firm specific variables is the firm dummy. First, for a concept
debut, the coefficient of the firm dummy for Honda is negative and significant and that for
Chrysler is significantly positive. This suggests that overall effect of demonstrating a concept
debut from Honda is smaller than that for other firms. As Table 2.1 shows, the number of

CHAPTER 2. EFFECTS OF PCD ON FIRM VALUE & RISKS

41

debut from Honda is the lowest (16, 8%). On the other hand, for a concept, Chrysler,
GM, and Honda have positive and significant coefficients (.3471, p<.05 for Chrysler, .8366,
p¡.01 for GM, .4084, p<.05 for Honda). It can be explained by the descriptive statistics
in Table 2.1. GM has the biggest share of total concept demonstration (146, 29.6%) and
Honda demonstrated 51 (10.3%) concepts during those data period which is greater than
the smallest share, Nissan’s 38 concept demonstration (7.7%). This result of positive effect
of many concept demonstrations from GM suggests that regarding concept demonstration
consistently demonstrate many models can be earned positive stock returns from the auto
show.

2.6.6

3SLS using New Variable Definitions

Table 2.11 presents the consistent results with previous findings in Table 2.10. The coefficient
of the Debut is positive and significant (.0023, p<0.05 in Table 2.11). However, in column (4)
in Table 2.11 shows that previously announced variables (e.g., Concept, Commercial Model,
and R&D Intensity) are not statistically significant, which are consistent with the theory
in finance which says that only the unanticipated information release affects the abnormal
returns.

2.6.7

Idiosyncratic Risk

The results in Table 2.12 are consistent with common knowledge in finance that the greater
stock returns come with the greater idiosyncratic risk for two weeks of windows. Tuli and
Bharadwaj (2009) show that improvement in customer satisfaction result in reduction in
overall and downside systematic and idiosyncratic risk. I find that demonstrating new concept in auto show increases the idiosyncratic risk (.0014, p<.01 in Table 2.12). This result
supports the argument that positive abnormal stock returns will also bring increasing idiosyncratic risk of the firm. On the other hand, I also propose that demonstrating concepts
will not affect idiosyncratic risk. As Table 2.12 shows, the coefficient of Concept is positive
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Table 2.11: Effects of Product Concept Demonstrations on Abnormal Returns: New Variable
Definition
(1)
Variables
Debut (First time)
Var.Debut
Concept (Previously demonstrated)
Commercial Model
Tech Debut R
Design Debut R
Intro.Ratio.Debut
Total Debut
R&D Intensity
Tech Concept R
Design Concept R
Intro.Ratio.Concept
Total Concept
R&D Intensity
Chrysler
Ford
GM
Honda
Toyota
Constant
R2 (%)
χ2
N
a ∗

(2)

(3)

(4)

Debuts

Concept

ACAR(0,+1)
.0023∗∗
-.0000
-.0005
.0003

1.1405∗∗
1.2683∗∗∗
1.0377∗∗∗
.1378∗∗∗
59.8363∗∗∗

a

-.0682
∗∗

.7957∗∗
1.0614∗∗∗
.9422∗∗∗
-.9561∗∗∗
.5108
-2.8012∗∗∗
59.46
334.23∗∗∗
228.

1.2654
-.0001
.3966
.1517∗∗∗
-60.0354∗∗∗
.7877∗∗
.1708
2.1625∗∗∗
1.0685∗∗∗
.0462
1.5065∗
57.03
302.04∗∗∗
228.

-.0066∗
-.0038
-.0062∗
-.0007
-.0030
.0058
8.01
17.90∗∗
228.

p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01

but not significant (.0003, n.s.). This suggests that there is no significant correlation between
second or third time concept demonstration and idiosyncratic risk. This result seems reasonable because a second or third time demonstrated concept does not have unanticipated
information, therefore, demonstrating concepts would not affect the idiosyncratic risk.

2.6.8

Systematic Risk

I expect that demonstrating current models decreases the systematic risk; however, the
coefficient of Commercial models is close to zero and not significant (.0000, n.s.). The firm’s
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Table 2.12: Effects of Product Concept Demonstrations on Idiosyncratic and Systematic
Risk
(1)

a ∗

(2)

(3)

Dependent Variables

Idiosyncratic Risk

Systematic Risk

Debut
Var.Debut
Concept
Commercial Model
Constant
R2 (%)
χ2
N

.0014∗∗∗a
-.0001
.0003
-.0001
-.0131∗∗∗
2.95
13.80∗∗∗
228.

.0000
.0003
.0000
.0000
-.0003∗∗∗
1.78
5.82
228.

p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01

systematic risk reflects the extent to which its stock’s return responds to movement of the
average return on all stocks in the market. This result suggests that there is no incentive for
firm to demonstrate current commercialized model in the auto show in order to reduce the
systematic risk.

2.6.9

Sensitivity Analysis

In order to check robustness of our analysis, I analyze the model with different event windows
for average cumulative abnormal returns (See Table 2.6). There is no significant change in
the substantive conclusions of the current study with various event windows including (-1,
+1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (-10, +10). This confirms that our event analysis is robust
and the events are not contaminated by other unanticipated information release such as an
earning announcement or a unexpected change from the firm.

2.7

Conclusion and Discussion

In this paper, I study firms’ product concept demonstration behavior on the trade show. I
analyze data from over six years of demonstrations and six different automakers over the
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thirty eight auto shows. This study is unique in several aspects. First, I analyze new
product concept demonstration data that are not well researched yet because most of prior
researches are only focus on actual launch of new product or preannouncement. Second,
I provide better assessment framework for the concept stage marketing actions. The long
lag between the initial demonstration of a concept model and its launch makes it difficult
to assess the contemporaneous effects of concept demonstration. Unlike commonly used
marketing metrics such as sales leads or actual sales, abnormal stock returns clearly capture
the effects of concept demonstrations such as the innovativeness of the firms as well as the
new product pipeline with revenue potentials. Third, unlike previous studies, I analyze
concurrent event study of six firms marketing actions and find synergic effect of new product
concept demonstrations.
The study of the relationship between product concept demonstrations and firm values
with both systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk contributes new insights to the emerging
marketing-finance literature by highlighting that demonstration of product concept contributes to the financial performance of the firm. I show that more number of technology
focused concept, design focused concept, and incremental changed concept have a robust
impact in increasing the abnormal return of the firm.
This study focuses on the fact that unanticipated information release of product concept
demonstrations affects the financial market hence on firm values. Thus first time demonstrated product concepts in auto show can increase future cash flow and sales lead when
the concept launches. However, strategic interactions between competing firms of demonstrations cannot be measured directly so that I could not capture the part that is canceling
competitive effect out each other. Research on the inter-dependence of product positioning
and product concept demonstrations can be a possible future research is. In most of auto
shows, all the six automakers are consistently demonstrates their concepts even though the
economic situation is not optimistic. Thus, another possible future research opportunity lies
in this question: why firm should demonstrate product concepts even though they don’t have
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a big shot to demonstrate even in economic recession? Finally, firms also need to consider a
strategic decision for cannibalization. Not only positioning of the new concept, but also the
price of it can be a crucial choice variable for firm to maximize the long term total profit.
Researchers also can study following questions: how much impact of the product concept
demonstration on the actual sales, and what would be the optimal level of product concept
demonstrations. Data set of advertising intensity and R&D intensity from COMPUSTAT
and Nielson Media Research consists of yearly basis values so that I need to implement two
possible scenarios of budget allocation. One can improve the results of analysis with monthly
or quarterly data set with my model. For future research opportunity, one can enhance the
empirical results by controlling more general financial variables such as profitability, profits
volatility, firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, market capitalization, dividend pay, firm
age, and firm diversification.

2.7.1

Limitations and Future Research Opportunities

This research focuses on the fact that only unanticipated information release of product
concept demonstrations affects the financial market hence on firm values. Thus unexpected
demonstrations in auto shows increases future cash flow and sales lead when the product
concept launches. However, the strategic interaction of demonstrations between competing
firms cannot be measured directly. Research on the inter-dependence of product positioning
and product concept demonstrations will contribute the current literature in this area.
Most of auto shows show that all the six firms are consistently demonstrates their concepts
even though the economic situation is not optimistic. One can try to answer this question:
why firm should demonstrate product concepts even though they do not have a promising
successful product concept to demonstrate in an economic recession?
For the future research opportunities, researchers can study following questions. How
much impact of the product concept demonstration on the actual sales? What would be the
optimal level of product concept demonstrations?

Chapter 3
Inter-temporal Pricing Strategy with
PCD
3.1

Literature Review

Trade shows are popular venues for automotive firms to showcase their innovative activities to
their industry cohorts and to the general public. A trade show serves a few different functions
for firms’ strategic marketing actions such as sales leads, signaling to investors their passion
for developing innovative products and pre-launch advertising (Kerin and Cron 1987, Kim
and Mazumdar 2012, Gopalakrishna, Sridhar, Lilien, and Siwale 2012.) An important effect
that has not been researched in this context is the shifting of demand toward a new model
because some buyers, who are perhaps informed by the trade show, prefer to wait for the new
model instead of purchasing a currently available model without delay. In general, consumers
want to maximize their utility based on the price and quality of the product when deciding
to purchase a product. If there is more than one product on the market, consumers would
most likely compare the utilities of the alternative options. Similarly, the announcement of
a new model launch motivates consumers to consider whether they wait for the new model
until the next new car season or not.
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Product positioning is an important issue not only for competing manufacturers but also
for the monopolistic firm because launching a new product can cause cannibalization of a
firm’s own sales of the old model if the new model is not well differentiated from the old one.
There are a number of analytical papers that model demand for differentiated products. In
regards to quality-based segmentation, Mussa and Rosen (1978), Katz(1984), and Moorthy
(1984) analyze problems of price and quality in monopoly settings investigating the product
positioning game with consideration both horizontal and vertical differentiation based upon
the fact that consumers self-select the product. Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) analyze
two-dimensional vertical differentiation models showing the maximum differentiation on one
dimension and minimum differentiation in the other dimension. In regards to spatial models,
Hotelling (1929) analyze the localized competition of the Hotelling model. Desai (2001) also
examines whether the cannibalization problem affects a firm’s price and quality decisions in
a model with consumer differences in quality valuation as well as taste differences in both
monopoly and duopoly settings.
In contrast to these previous studies which either focus on vertical or horizontal differentiated products, I consider both vertical and horizontal product differentiation at the same
time to improve managerial implications. Analyzing both horizontal and vertical differentiations using a spatial model and a self-selection model is inefficient and seldom feasible
to result in a closed-form solution. Thus, I use the representative consumer utility model
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Häcker 2000, Choi and Coughlan 2006, Coughlan and Ingene 2010,
Park, Staelin, Choi, and Borle 2011) and derive a demand model based on this utility formulation. This methodological decision is important not only because the representative
utility model provides closed form solutions for the two systems of demand (with a product
concept demonstration and without a product concept demonstration) but also because it
provides clear insights into the effects of changes in underlying utility parameters (such as
a substitutability between the old and new model, as well as the quality, discount rate, on
market outcomes, profits, and prices of the new model). From the derived demand function
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parameters and consumer behavior parameters – such as quality of the product and marginal
utility of consumption – I can determine how substitutability between old and new models
affects demand while holding other consumer parameters fixed.
To examine the inter-temporal strategic behavior, I extend the analysis of Dhebar (1994)
who models the problem of a durable-goods monopolist selling sequential versions of a product. Previously, Kornish (2001) extended the analysis of Dhebar (1994) to show two possible
subgame perfect equilibrium pricing strategies: the first strategy occurs when the firm offers an extremely low first-period price to attract a large number of consumers purchasing,
while the second strategy is when the monopolist charges the single-period optimizing price.
I modify the sequential versions of a product setting (Dhebar 1994) into the old and new
model set up and follow the inter-temporal pricing model (Kornish 2001) for firm’s profit
maximization.

3.2

Model

I first introduce our assumptions about the product and the players needed to set up the
model. Even though I discuss the automotive industry, the model applies to any durable
product category. In order to emphasize the inter-temporal strategic decisions of the players,
I develop a two-period model in a monopoly market.

3.2.1

Product

A firm sells the old model(product 1) in only period 1, and the new model (product 2)
in only period 2. In period 1, the firm chooses whether to demonstrate the new product
concept in the trade show or not. In period 2, only the new model is available for purchasing
on the market. qi is the quantity of product i where product 1 denotes the old model
and product 2 does the new model, pi is the price of the product i, and αi represents the
intrinsic valuation of product i and it can be interpreted as the perceived quality of product
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i. Thus, |α2 − α1 |, captures vertical product differentiation. Substitutability, parameter γ
measures the decline rate of marginal utility of consumption for one product with respect to
the consumption of one of the other products (Choi and Coughlan 2006). Thus, it captures
the horizontal differentiation between the old and new model. Lastly, low γ means a high
degree of horizontal differentiation and high γ denotes less horizontal differentiation.
Unlike frequently purchased goods, durable goods last for more than one period; therefore,
demand is linked over time. The product I consider is an automobile and the venue of the
demonstration is an auto show, currently one of the most popular types of trade shows. I
assume that there is no resale of merchandise, both between the consumers, and between
consumer and the manufacturer. I also assume that there is no second-hand market.

3.2.2

Consumer

My model starts with the representative consumer utility model and extends previous works
such as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Dhebar (1994), Häcker (2000), Choi and Couglan (2006),
Coughlan and Ingene (2010), Park, Staelin, Choi, and Borle (2011) by adding inter-temporal
strategic decisions for both the monopolistic firm and a representative consumer. The representative consumer is rational and decides on market participation and purchase timing
to maximize his surplus (gross utility minus price). The representative consumer utility
function is widely used in economics and marketing because it has favorable tractability especially to result in a closed-form solution of the game theoretic model since it is continuous
and differentiable.
When the monopolistic firm does not demonstrate a product concept, the representative
consumer considers only one product in each period. Thus, the utility function in period 1
is
β1 q1 2
U (q1 ) = (α1 − p1 )q1 −
2

(3.1)
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and the utility function in period 2 is

U (q2 ) = (α2 − p2 )q2 −

β2 q2 2
2

(3.2)

where qi is the quantity of product i where product 1 denotes an old model and product 2 does
a new model, pi is the price of the product i; and where αi represents the intrinsic valuation
of product i and can be interpreted as the perceived quality of product i. βi denoting the
degree of marginal utility of consumption that declines with increasing consumption so that
the second term captures the diminishing marginal utility of consumption.
This system of utility function gives us a parsimonious comparison between the two
demand systems: demand with a demonstration and demand without a demonstration (even
though this system of utility function does not allow us to incorporate heterogeneity across
consumers). When the monopolistic firm demonstrates the new product concept in period
1, the representative consumer utility is


2
β2 q2D
β1 q 1 2
+ δ (α2 − p2 )q2D −
− γq1 q2D
U (q1 , q2D ) = (α1 − p1 )q1 −
2
2

(3.3)

and the representative consumer utility in period 2 is

U (q2 ) = (α2 − p2 )q2 −

β2 q2 2
2

(3.4)

where αi , βi ,and δ are positive. The difference between the quality of the old and new
products, |α2 − α1 |, captures vertical product differentiation. q2D denotes the expected
demand of delayed purchases from the consumers in period 1 who decide to wait for the
new product concept, which will be launched in the next period. Parameter γ measures
the decline rate of marginal utility of consumption for one product with respect to the
consumption of one of the other products (Choi and Coughlan 2006). Specifically, γ denotes
horizontal product differentiation driven by the substitutability between the old and new
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product (Häcker 2000, Singh and Vives 1985). If γ = 0, horizontal product differentiation
is maximized, and if γ = βi , the two products are perfect substitutes for i = 1, 2. Both
the firm and a representative consumer share a discount factor (δ) that lowers the present
value of future consumption. This parameter is related disutility, which is driven by the
substitutability between the old and new products.
It is important to note that in period 1, consumers have two choices: to buy the old model
or to wait for the new model if they believe that the new model price will be significantly
lower in the second period, (will have a higher quality with unchanged price levels or will be
quite different from the previous version. Incentives to wait for the new model depend on (i)
the price difference perceived, (ii) the style difference perceived, (iii) the quality difference,
and (iv) the discount factor. By demonstrating a new product concept model, the firm can
help the portion of the consumers not purchase the old model of the product but wait for
the next generation model because the quality, style and price levels of the new model are
announced in period 1 through the new product concept demonstration, hence, known to
consumers.
Based on the utility maximization, I present a demand model derived from the representative consumer utility framework in a monopoly market. The goal of the monopolistic firm
is to maximize the total profit during the entire two periods by setting new model quality and
its design (substitutability) and implementing a product concept demonstration of the new
model. The quadratic and concave utility function gives rise to a linear demand structure.
For the parsimonious parameter set, I assume β1 = β2 = β. There are two possible options:
to demonstrate a new model or not. When the monopolistic firm does not demonstrate a
new product concept, I have simpler demand functions from the representative utility, as
follows.
q1 =

α1 − p1
β

(3.5)

q2 =

α2 − p2
β

(3.6)
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When the monopolistic firm demonstrates a new product concept, I obtain the following
demand system:
q1 =

β(α1 − p1 ) − δγ(α2 − p2 )
β 2 − δγ 2

(3.7)

α2 − p2
β

(3.8)

q2 =
q2D =
Q2 = q2 + q2D =

β(α2 − p2 ) − γ(α1 − p1 )
β 2 − δγ 2
α2 − p2 β(α2 − p2 ) − γ(α1 − p1 )
+
β
β 2 − δγ 2

(3.9)
(3.10)

where γ 2 ≤ β 2 , and 0 ≤ γ < β. The total demand for the new model in period 2 is the
summation of two parts: one part from the delayed purchases in period 1 and the other from
demand in period 2. This effect of this demonstration can be captured by the difference
of baseline demands and that of inter-temporal price sensitivities. I normalize the quality
level of the old model (α1 ) as 1 and the quality of the new model as positive so that the
quality of the new model can be either higher or lower than the old model. It is clear that a
high quality product gives consumers a higher utility and |α2 − α1 | is the quality difference
between the old and new model. Also, I assume that new model quality is greater than or
equal to the old model quality because in the real world firms seldom introduce lower quality
in the new model (α2 ≥ α1 = 1).

3.2.3

Monopolistic firm

For analytical simplicity, I assume that there is zero marginal cost for production and no
fixed cost for a product concept demonstration. I also assume that the manufacturer does not
sell the old product in period 2. This assumption is consistent with the real world situation
where the old model is no longer available for purchase when the new model launches. I will
relax this assumption by allowing the old model purchasing in period 2 in the extension.
Suppose that a monopolist has the flexibility to charge different prices for each time
period (inter-temporal price discrimination) and to make different design and quality over
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time. The profit function that the monopolistic firm faces is as follows:

3.3

Π1 = p1 q1

(3.11)

Π2 = p2 (q2 + q2d )

(3.12)

T otalΠ = Π1 + Π2 = p1 q1 + p2 (q2 + q2d )

(3.13)

Analysis

By using a backward induction,I solve the two periods game described above. Assuming that
the variables in period 1 are given, I solve the profit maximizing problem. After obtaining
the solution in period 2, I insert those solutions and maximize the total profit for both
period 1 and period 2. Given the equilibrium quantity of product 1 and product 2, I solve
for the new model price in period 2. Finally, I solve for the old model price to maximize the
total profit from the two periods. In Table 3.1, I summarize the optimal solutions for price,
quantity, and profit both as a benchmark case and a demonstration case.

3.4

Results

In this section, I present the equilibrium solutions for quantity, delayed purchases, price, and
profit for both cases – that is, in cases with a product concept demonstration and without
a product concept demonstration. I also highlight results related to delayed purchases: the
price of the new and old model, and the profit differences between cases with and without a
product concept demonstration.
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium Solutions

With a Demonstrationa

No Demo

p∗1

−4 + γ{γ + 3γδ − α2 (−1 + δ)(−2 + γ 2 δ)}
−8 + γ 2 (1 + 6δ)

α1
2

p∗2

−4γ + 3γ 3 δ + α2 (−2 + γ 2 δ)(−8 + 7γ 2 δ)
2(−2 + γ 2 δ){−8 + γ 2 (1 + 6δ)}

α2
2

q1∗

−1 + p1 − (p2 − α2 )γδ
−1 + γ 2 δ

α1
2

q2∗

α 2 − p2

α2
2

∗
q2D

π1∗
π2∗

a

(p2 − α2 ) + (1 − p1 )γ
−1 + γ 2 δ


(4−γ 2 (1+3δ)+α2 γ(−1+δ)(−2+γ 2 δ)) −(4−3γ 2 δ)2 +α2 γ(−2+γ 2 δ)[−4+δ{−4+γ 2 (4+3δ)}]
−2{−8+γ 2 (1+6δ)}2 {2+γ 2 δ(−3+γ 2 δ)}

(−4γ + 3γ 3 δ + α2 (−2 + γ 2 δ)(−8 + 7γ 2 δ))2
4{−8 + γ 2 (1 + 6δ)}2 {2 + γ 2 δ(−3 + γ 2 δ)}

Without loss of generality, I set α1 = 1, β = 1.

0
α12
4
α22
4
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Figure 3.1: New Model Quantity (q2∗ )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)

Figure 3.2: Old Model Quantity (q1∗ )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)
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∗
Figure 3.3: The U-Shaped Delayed Purchases (q2d
)
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)

3.4.1

Quantity and Delayed Purchases

Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the new and old model quantity with two product differentiation parameters: the level of new model quality (α2 ) and substitutability between the old
and new model (γ). These two figures present consistent results to the comparative statics
for the quantity of the old and new model as seen in Table 3.2. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2
show that the more vertically differentiated the new model is (the higher is the new model
quality, α2 ), the greater quantity of the new model and the less quantity of the old model
are sold. Similarly, the more the new model is horizontally differentiated (the lower is the
substitutability, γ), the greater quantity of the new model and the less quantity of the old
model are sold.
Figure 3.3 shows that the delayed purchase of the new model is positively correlated to
the quality of the new model; however, the delayed purchase has the U-shaped pattern with
respect to the substitutability (γ). The U-shaped pattern of delayed purchase is reflected
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in two concepts for distinct strategic forces: distinctive alternatives and new product
superiority . First, some portion of the consumers might prefer waiting for the new model
because of the horizontal differentiation of the new model from the old model, even in the
situation where the new version has not been improved. I call this ‘distinctive alternatives.’ One example of this horizontal differentiation is the newness or styling change of
the new model in the automobile industry. This phenomenon supports the increase of the
delayed purchases as the substitutability of two products decreases (see Result 1 a). In other
words, when the new product is more horizontally differentiated from the old product, the
delayed purchases can increase. Second, another portion of the consumers might wait for
the new product in Period 2 because of the improved higher quality of the new product. For
example, the new model can have a larger engine size and better gas mileage. I call instances
like this ‘new product superiority .’ Figure 3.3 plots delayed purchases which increase as
the new product quality improves. I formalize these findings in Result 1.

Result 1 (Delayed Purchases)
(a) The delayed purchases show a U-shaped pattern with respect to the product substitutability
over a certain range of the new mode’s quality and the discounting factor.
(b) The more the new model is vertically differentiated (the higher is the new model quality,
α2 ), the more delayed purchases for the new model are sold.

A product concept demonstration generates delayed purchases from consumers who have
a willingness to wait for the new model, which presumably will have an improved quality
or/and a differentiated design from the old model. In order to achieve greater analytical
tractability, I distinguish the demand of the delayed purchases (q2D ) from the demand of the
new model in period 2 (q2 ). Before I explain the delayed purchases driven by the product
concept demonstration, Table 3.1 shows the optimal solutions of a two period game for the
demand of the old model, the demand of the new model, and the delayed demand for the new
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model. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the quantity of the new and old models, respectively,
while Figure 3.3 shows the delayed purchases. I seek to gain a deeper understanding of how
delayed purchases change with respect to the three parameters: the substitutability between
the old and new model, the quality of the new model, and the discounting factor.
Comparative statics in Table 3.2 show two findings about delayed purchases with respect
to the new model quality and the discounting factor. First, delayed purchases increase as
∂q2D
> 0). It is easy to understand
long as the quality of the new model increases(e.g.,
∂α2
that superior quality of the new product can attract more consumers to wait for a period
to purchase a higher quality model. Second, delayed purchases increase as long as the
∂q2D
> 0). It is clear to see that, if the cost of waiting for
discounting factor increases (e.g.,
∂δ
the new model decreases – or, in other words, as the discounting factor (δ) increases – then
more consumers want to wait because the opportunity cost for waiting reduces with higher
δ. See Table 3.2
The delayed purchases show a U-shaped pattern with respect to the product substitutability with a certain range of the quality level of the new model such as α2 ≥ 1 and the
range of the discounting factor such as δ ≥ 0.485. See Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. Given
a certain level of parameter value, I present the relationship between the two parameter in
the two dimensional spaces . The highest curve on Figure 3.4 is the delayed purchases with
the highest quality level of the new product, a2 = 1.3 (meaning that 30% of quality level is
greater than that of old product). The lower curves are the delayed purchases with new quality levels of a2 = 1.2, 1.1, 1.01, 1, 0.99, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7 respectively. With this specific discounting
factor, if the quality of the new product is greater than the one of the old model, the delayed
purchases with respect to product substitutability have a U-shaped curve. Figure 3.5 shows
the delayed purchases with respect to product substitutability with a certain quality level
of new product (α2 = 1). With the same quality level of both old and new products, if the
discounting factor is greater than 0.485, then delayed purchases have a U-shaped curve with
respect to substitutability of the old and new product.
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Table 3.2: Comparative Statics
Substitutability
(γ)
q1
q2
q2D > 0
p1
p2
p1 − p1n
p2 − p2n
p2 − p1
Πb
Π − Πn c

−
+
if δ is big.
otherwise.

(
−/ + a
−
(
+/− if α2 is big.
−
otherwise.
−
(
+/− if α2 is big.
−
otherwise.
−
−
−
−/+

New Model Quality
(α2 )

Discount Factor
(δ)

−
+

−
+

+

+

+

−

+

−

+

−

+
+
+
+

−
+
−
−

a

“ − / + ” shows U-shaped pattern and “+/−” shows inverted U-shaped pattern as the substitutability
goes close to 1
b
Π ≡ π1 + π2 .
c
Πn ≡ π1n − π2n .

Figure 3.4: Delayed Purchases with respect to Product Substitutability with Discounting
Factor

(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = 0.485, α2 = 0.7
(Lowest), 0.8, 0.9, 0.99, 1, 1.01, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 (Highest)
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Figure 3.5: Delayed Purchases with respect to Product Substitutability with Fixed New
Model Quality

(Parameter values used: α1 = α2 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, 0 < δ ≤ 1, δ =
0.3(Lowest), 0.4, 0.475, 0.495, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99 (Highest)
However, delayed purchases do not show a U-shaped pattern for all the parameter space.
See Figure 3.6 which presents the parameter range of a U-shaped pattern of the delayed
purchases with respect to the substitutability between the old and new model. To guarantee
that the delayed purchases have a U-shaped pattern, I first require that α2 ≥ 0.789. If the
quality level of the new model is smaller than 0.789, then the delayed purchases monotonically
decrease as the substitutability of the two models increases. In other words, if the quality
of the new product is even lower than the old product under a certain level, then delayed
purchases shrink as the difference between the old and new models become smaller. Finally,
if the discounting factor is too big over a certain level (δ ≥ 0.129), then delayed purchases
might decrease as the substitutability increases. It is clear to see that the discounting factor
can be a disincentive for consumers to wait for the new model by the next period. In Figure
3.6, the shaded region shows the parameter pairs that give U-shaped pattern of delayed
purchases.
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Figure 3.6: The Parameter Range of U-Shaped Delayed Purchases with respect to substitutability

Figure 3.7: New Model Price (p∗2 )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)
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New Model Price

I first explain how the three consumer parameters (the new product quality, the substitutability, and the discounting factor) affect the prices of the old and new models when the
firm demonstrates the new model concept in period 1. I then compare the impact of these
three consumer parameters between two cases – that is where firms do and do not have a
new model concept demonstration.
First, let’s focus on the new model’s price with respect to three parameters. Note that
from Table 3.2 the price of the new product (p2 ) decreases as the substitutability of the old
∂p2
< 0) because of the cannibalization of customers between
and new product increases (
∂γ
the old and new models; moreover, note that the more similar the two models, the more
∂p2
> 0) (See
cannibalization occurs. Next, the quality effect of a new model is positive (
∂α2
Appendix B for the Proofs). Also, the price of the new model (p2 ) decreases as the discounting
∂p2
< 0). It is easy to understand that if the cost of waiting for the new
factor (δ) increases (
∂δ
model (δ) decreases, then the manufacturer can set the price lower to attract the consumers
who want to wait.
For the comparison between cases with and without having a new concept demonstration,
note that the closed form solutions in Table 3.1 indicate that the new model price (p2 ) with
a demonstration is always lower than the new model price without a demonstration. This
result may seem counter-intuitive because after giving more alternatives to consumers the
firm still charges less than the new model without having a concept demonstration. To gain
a deeper understanding of why the price of the new model with a demonstration can be lower
than the price of new model without a demonstration, I rearrange the demand equation for
a new model. From Equation (3.8) and Equation (3.9),

Q2 = q2 + q2D =

β 2 δα2 − βδγ(α1 − p1 ) + α2 δ(β 2 − γ 2 δ) β 2 + δ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)
−
p2
βδ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)
βδ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)

Lets call the constant term A such as A =

(3.14)

β 2 δα2 − βδγ(α1 − p1 ) + α2 δ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)
and the
βδ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)
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β 2 + δ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)
respectively. Then Equation (3.14) becomes Q2 =
βδ(β 2 − γ 2 δ)
∂A
∂B
∂A
∂B
A − Bp2 . Note that
> 0,
> 0,
> 0 and
= 0. These comparative statics
∂γ
∂γ
∂α2
∂α2
for the total demand for the new model are shown in Figure 3.8. The total demand line
slope B such as B =

for the new model rotates clockwise as substitutability increases close to 1 (or β) and shifts
upward from the origin as the new model quality increases. Even though the demand curve
rotates clockwise, the intercept moves on a much higher level than before as the new model
differs from the old model. Hence, if the new model is less horizontally differentiated (or if
the new model has higher substitutability), then the demand for the new model expands.
In Figure 3.8, I confirm these effects of vertical and horizontal differentiation. Points on
each demand line in the Figure 3.8 show equilibrium price and quantity respectively, so I
can precisely observe what is happening while the demand line is shifting or rotating. For
the new model, if the firm demonstrates a new concept model, then the new model price
decreases no matter at what level the firm sets the price. In Figure 3.9, I used a higher
quality (α2 = 1.2) to contrast the differences and I confirm that all the demand lines shift
upward compared to Figure 3.8 when the new model is not different from the old model
vertically (α1 = 1); however, both traces of equilibrium sets show a U-shaped pattern as
well. Note that this U-shaped pattern is driven from the delayed purchases and the total
quality of the new model is the sum of the new model quantity and the delayed purchases.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the new model price can be lower than the old
model price (p2 < p1 ) if the firm demonstrates the concept model. I already showed that
∂p2
> 0) and the price of the new model
the quality effect of the new model is positive (
∂α2
∂p2
(p2 ) decreases as the discounting factor for the new model (δ) increases (
< 0). The
∂δ
substitution effect of the new model, however, is negative. Therefore, if the substitutability
is high enough to dominate the quality effect and discounting factor effect, then the new
model can be cheaper than the old model. I summarize these results here as follows:

Result 2 (New Model Price)
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∗
), α2 = 1
Figure 3.8: New Model Demand (q2∗ + q2d

a
∗
Figure 3.9: New Model Demand (q2∗ + q2d
), α2 = 1.2
a

The lowest line is the demand line for the new model when the firm does not have a new concept
demonstration. Among five points, the black one indicates an equilibrium with γ = 0, while the next three
dots show equilibriums of γ = 0.2, 0.4, and0.6. The farthest red point indicates an equilibrium of γ = 0.8.
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(a) The new model price with a demonstration is lower than the new model price without a
demonstration for all new model quality levels, hence, the total new model quantity with a
demonstration is greater than that with out a demonstration.
(b) The new model price with a demonstration is lower than the old model price with a
demonstration at some parameter ranges where the new model quality is still higher than
the old model quality (price puzzle). However, if the vertical differentiation dominates the
horizontal differentiation, then the new model price is higher than the old model price.

I graphically capture these results in Figure 3.10. Figure 3.10 shows the price difference
of the new model between cases with and without a demonstration. All feasible range of
the new model price are negative; hence, the new model price with a demonstration is
always lower than that without a demonstration. Moreover, as the two old and new models
get more similar, the difference between new model prices in cases with and without a
demonstration becomes larger. This happens because as two models become more similar
(γ → 1), the difference between the new model price with a demonstration and that without
a demonstration becomes larger. Because two models become more similar in these cases,
then the price competition between them would intensify.
From Figure 3.11, I find that the old model price when having a concept demonstration is
higher than the old model price without having a concept demonstration. When the old and
new models get horizontally closer, the price difference gets smaller. Note that even though
the new model quality is higher than the old model quality, there are still parameter ranges
where the new model price is lower than the old model price. The price difference of the old
and new model is plotted with respect to substitutability and the new model’s quality level
(see Figure 3.12). This is a counterintuitive result given that the higher quality new product
is cheaper than the old lower quality product and the degree of difference gets larger as the
substitutability between the old and new model shrinks (as γ → 1). However, when the new
model is vertically differentiated enough from the old model, the price of the new product
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is greater than that of the old product with relatively low discounting factor (δ ≥ .6). This
is consistent with common knowledge that the better the quality of a product, the higher
the price the market will bear. Thus, if the vertical differentiation dominates the horizontal
differentiation, then this pricing puzzle can be resolved.
Furthermore, when there is no vertical differentiation (when the new model quality is
also 1), the price of the new product is always smaller than that of the old model. Also,
notice that the higher new model quality, the greater the price difference between the old
and new models. If the discounting factor gets closer to 1, then the price difference between
the two also becomes larger.

3.4.3

Old Model Price

I find that the old model price (p1 ) shows an inverted U-shaped pattern as the substitutability
of the old and new model increases. See Figure 3.13. In other words, there exists a parameter
∂p1
> 0 ) as the substitutability
range where the old model price is higher than the new one (
∂γ
of two models increases. See Figure 3.14 and 3.15. At the same time, as the new model gets
more similar to the old one, the old model quality decreases, which is not consistent with
economic theory. The old model price, however, decreases as the two models get horizontally
closer. Note that there are two different strategic forces working here. First, the competitive
pricing makes the old model price lower as the substitutability gets higher.1 The second
strategic force is the substitution effect in the new model, which occurs when decreases in
the old model even though the old model price is cheaper. This shows that the old model is
also affected by the negative substitution effect between old and new models as far as there
is no dominating vertical differentiation of the new model.
Second, the price of the old model (p1 ) increases as the quality of the new model (α2 )
1

Strictly speaking, a cannibalization is not a competition in a monopoly market; however, I use the term,
‘competitive pricing’ here because there are two different models competing with each other to attract more
consumers from each other’s demand. This happens even though the monopolist maximizes the total profits
from both old and new models.
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Figure 3.10: The Price Difference of the New Model between the Demonstration Case and
No Demonstration Case (p∗2 − p∗2n )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)

Figure 3.11: The Price Difference of the Old Model between the Demonstration Case and
No Demonstration Case (p∗1 − p∗1n )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)
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Figure 3.12: The Price Difference between the New and Old Model (p∗2 − p∗1 )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)

Figure 3.13: Old Model Price (p∗1 )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)
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Figure 3.14: Old Model Demand (q1∗ ), α2 = 1

a

Figure 3.15: Old Model Demand (q1∗ ), α2 = 1.2
a

The least stiff line is the demand line for the old model when the firm does not have a new concept
demonstration, while the black point indicates an equilibrium with γ = 0 and the next three dots show
equilibria of γ = 0.2, 0.4, and0.6. The lowest red point indicates an equilibrium of γ = 0.8.

CHAPTER 3. INTER-TEMPORAL PRICING STRATEGY WITH PCD

70

∂p1
> 0 because of the lower rate of cannibalization between the old and
∂α2
new models. Prior research shows that when the quality of a new model has been increased,

gets higher; thus,

two strategic forces occur: demand force and strategic force (Vandenbosch and Weinberg
1995). Based on the demand force, if the new model is superior to the old model in terms
of vertical differentiation, then the demand for the old model decreases. On the other hand,
due to the strategic force, if the quality difference of the old and new model diminishes price
competition, then the price of the old model rises.
Third, the price of the old model (p1 ) decreases as the discounting factor for the new
∂p1
< 0 . Note that the higher the discounting factor, the smaller the
model (δ) decreases,
∂δ
parameter (δ). It is easy to see that if the cost of waiting for the new model (δ) decreases,
then more consumers are willing to wait because the new model will give consumers higher
utility than before. Hence, if the discounting factor decrease, then the price of the old model
(p1 ) decreases.
Note that from a product concept demonstration, downward effects of substitutability
and discounting factors on the old model price are greater with a demonstration than that
of the old model without a demonstration (See Figure 3.11). At the same time, if the new
model is of a better quality than the old model, the price of the old model increases because
relative price competition between the old and new models weakens. These insights lead to
Result 3.

Result 3(Old Model Price)
(a) The old model price with a demonstration shows an inverted U-shaped pattern as the
∂p1
substitutability of the old and new product increases. However, the negative pricing effect,
∂γ
is much stronger where the new model is slightly horizontally differentiated than the positive
∂p1
pricing effect,
> 0 where the new model is sufficiently horizontally differentiated.
∂γ
(b) The old model price with a demonstration increases as the new model quality increases
due to the less competitive pricing pressure between old and new models.
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Profit

In this subsection, I focus on the total profit of the monopolistic firm and summarize results
describing how total profit is changed when the three parameters change: substitutability
between the old and new model, the quality of the new model, and the discount factor. See
also Table 3.2.
First, Figure 3.16 indicates that the profit from the old model decreases as the new model
is less horizontally differentiated and the new model quality gets higher. Figure 3.17 shows
that the profit from the new model increases as the new model quality gets higher. The profit
from the new model is the greatest at very low or very high levels of product substitutability,
exhibiting a U-shaped pattern.
Second, the firm’s total profit increases as the two products become more horizontally
differentiated, as indicated in Table 3.2. This effect is also graphically shown in the example
in Figure 3.18. The new model, when sufficiently differentiated from the old model, can
attract those consumers who do not find the old model to fit their taste to wait for the new
model. In this aspect, distinctive alternatives pay off in the two-period market when there
is a product concept demonstration.
I also find from the closed form solution in Table 3.1 that a product concept demonstration does not always give the monopolistic firm a positive profit impact when the discounting
factor gets too large. In other words, only when two models are horizontally differentiated
and discounting factors are not too high can the firm experience a positive profit effect by
demonstrating a new product concept in period 1. On the other hand, if the new model is
vertically differentiated from the old model, then the firm has a wider range of horizontal
differentiation between old and new models and a wide range in the discounting factor (i.e.,
a positive total profit effect is more likely). I summarize these insights below.

Result 4 (Total Profit)
Engaging in a pre-launch product concept demonstration is not an optimal strategy if the new

CHAPTER 3. INTER-TEMPORAL PRICING STRATEGY WITH PCD

Figure 3.16: Profit from Old Model (π1∗ )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)

Figure 3.17: Profit from New Model (π2∗ )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)
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Figure 3.18: Total Profit (π1∗ + π2∗ )
(Parameter values used: α1 = 1, β = 1, 0 ≤ γ < β, δ = .9)
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model is not sufficiently differentiated from the old model. Only sufficiently differentiated
(either horizontally or vertically, or both) new models can create a positive profit effect with
a demonstration.

3.5

Extensions

Remember that I assume that the monopolist sells the old model only in period 1. I now
generalize this assumption, and consider the case where an old product is still available for
purchase in the second period market. In such a market, the firm has two different pricing
strategies for the old model. The first strategy is that the firm sells the old model at the
same price in the first period. I call this ‘Simple Pricing Strategy’. In this case, the firm in
period 2 maximizes the profit by controlling only the new model price and the new model
quality since the old model quality is fixed in period 1. The second pricing strategy is that
the firm charges lower price for the old model in the second period because of two reasons:
the firm has incentives to clear its inventory holdings or to increase customer trials for
market expansion in the near future.2 I call this ‘Complex Pricing Strategy’. This reduced
old model price affects the new model demand in period 2 due to the cheaper price of the
old model especially if the new model is not differentiated enough to attract consumers. In
this situation, it would be meaningful to check whether the new model price with a concept
demonstration can go lower than that of the old model. If so, the price puzzle of the new
product – that the new model price is lower than the old model price – can be explained.
2

Even though I analyze the monopoly market, to attract consumers who are less willing to pay for the old
model, the firm achieves market expansion through increasing customer trials. For example, apply reduces
the price of existing models when they launch a new iPhone version.
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Model

For the simple pricing model, Equation 3.3 becomes Equation 3.15 for period 1 and Equation
3.4 becomes Equation 3.16 for period 2, as follows:
2
β2 q 2 2
β1 q11
+ (α2 − p2 )q2 −
− γq11 q2
2
2

U (q11 , q2D ) = (α1 − p1 )q11 −

U (q12 , q2 ) = (α1 − p1 )q12 −

2
β1 q12
β2 q2 2
+ (α2 − p2 )q2 −
− γq12 q2
2
2

(3.15)

(3.16)

Remember that consumers in period 1 have no incentive to wait and purchase the old model
in period 2 (e.g., q1d = 0 in simple pricing model) because the old model price will be the
identical to the old model price in period 1, quality and design of the old model will be the
same, and there is positive waiting cost (e.g., discounting factor, δ > 0).
For the complex pricing model, I have
2
β1 q11
U (q11 , q1D , q2D ) = (α1 − p1 )q11 −
2

2
2
β1 q1D
β2 q2D
+ δ (α1 − p12 )q1D −
+ (α2 − p2 )q2D −
2
2

− q11 q1D − γq11 q2D − γq1D q2D

U (q12 , q2 ) = (α1 − p1 )q12 −

2
β1 q12
β2 q2 2
+ (α2 − p2 )q2 −
− γq12 q2
2
2

(3.17)

(3.18)

I distinguish the old model demand between period 1 and period 2 by using a two-digits subscript: q1k denotes the old model quantity in period k and prices have consistent subscripts.
q1D denotes the old model quantity sold in period 2 from the delayed purchases from period
1. The only difference between Equation 3.16 and 3.18 is the old model price (p1 vs.p12 ), and
this is what makes Equation 3.17 so complicated. Note that the substitutability measure is
only meaningful for two different models so that the fifth term inside of the square bracket
does not have γ.
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Demand

Demand derivation of these two different models is consistent with the baseline model. When
the firm demonstrates a new concept model, I have the following demand system for the
simple pricing model:
q11 =

β(1 − p1 ) + (p2 − α2 )γδ
β 2 − γ 2δ

(3.19)

q12 =

β(1 − p1 ) + (p2 − α2 )γ
β2 − γ2

(3.20)

q2 =

β(α2 − p2 ) + (p1 − 1)γ
β2 − γ2

(3.21)

q2D =

β(α2 − p2 ) + (p1 − 1)γ
β 2 − γ 2δ

(3.22)

For the complex pricing model with having a new concept model demonstration, I have
β 2 (1 − p11 ) + β(−1 + p12 + p2 γ − α2 γδ) + γ{(−p2 + α2 )δ + γ(−1 + p11 + δ − p12 δ)}
β 3 + γ 2 δ − β{δ + γ 2 (1 + δ)}
(3.23)
2
β (1 − p12 ) + β(−1 + p11 + p2 γ − α2 γ) + γ{(−p2 + α2 )δ − γ(−1 + p11 + δ − p12 δ)}
=
β 3 + γ 2 δ − β{δ + γ 2 (1 + δ)}
(3.24)
β(1 − p12 ) + (p2 − α2 )γ
(3.25)
q12 =
β2 − γ2

q11 =

q1D

q2 =
q2D =

β(α2 − p2 ) + (p12 − 1)γ
β2 − γ2

α2 (β 2 − δ) + p2 (−β 2 + δ) + γ{1 + p11 (−1 + β) + (−2 + p12 )β + δ − p12δ}
β 3 + 2γ 2 δ − β{δ + γ 2 (1 + δ)}

(3.26)
(3.27)

By solving this inter-temporal two-period game using backward induction, I have sets of
equilibrium solutions for the two pricing models, respectively. See Table 3.3. More than
anything else, I focus on checking whether these two extended models satisfy my major
findings from Result 1 through Result 5. Both simple and complex pricing models satisfy all
the results from Result 1 (the delayed purchases), Result 2 (the new product price), Result
3 (the old model price), Result 4 (total profit), and Result 5 (welfare).
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Figure 3.19: Extension: Total Quantity of Old Model

∗ + q∗ )
(a) Simple Pricing (q11
12

∗ + q∗ + q∗ )
(b) Complex Pricing (q11
12
1d

For the following six subsections I compare these two extended models to the baseline
model.

3.5.3

Equilibrium Quantity

Figure 3.19a and 3.19b show the total quantity of the old model for both simple and complex
pricing strategies. By definition, the old model price of complex pricing strategy is lower
than that of simple pricing strategy. Therefore, the quantity of complex pricing strategy is
greater than that of simple pricing strategy.
Figure 3.20a and 3.20b show the total quantity of the new model for both simple and
complex pricing strategy. The new model total quantity of simple pricing strategy is slightly
greater than that of complex pricing strategy. This is a sequential outcome of a cheaper
old model price in the complex pricing strategy. The strategic force working in here is
price competition force. As I mentioned previously, even though there is no competition in
a monopoly market, ‘competitive pricing’ can exist because two different models compete
with each other to attract more consumers from each other’s demand.
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Figure 3.20: Extension: Total Quantity of New Model

∗ )
(a) Simple Pricing (q2∗ + q2d

3.5.4

∗ )
(b) Complex Pricing (q2∗ + q2d

Delayed Purchases

Figure 3.21a and 3.21b show delayed purchases for both simple and complex pricing strategies. Figure 3.21c shows the difference between the two. Both Figure 3.21a and 3.21b are
consistent to the figure of delayed purchases of baseline pricing strategy. From Figure 3.21c,
the difference between simple and complex pricing strategy is either positive or negative,
depending on the parameter values. Specifically, if the vertical differentiation is dominant to
the horizontal differentiation, then the delayed purchases of simple pricing strategy is greater
than that of complex pricing strategy.

3.5.5

New Model Price

Figure 3.22a and 3.22b show the new model prices for both simple and complex pricing
strategies. Overall, the new model price of simple pricing strategy is higher than that of
complex pricing strategy because the old model price of complex pricing strategy is lower
than that of simple pricing strategy by definition. As I explained before in Result 6, the
competitive pricing effect makes this happen (pSimple
> pComplex
).
2
2
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Figure 3.21: Extension: Delayed Purchases (q2d
)

(a) Simple Pricing

(b) Complex Pricing

(c) Simple − Complex
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Figure 3.22: Extension: New Model Price

(a) Simple Pricing

3.5.6

(b) Complex Pricing

Old Model Price

Figure 3.23a, 3.23b, and 3.23c show the old model prices for both simple and complex pricing
strategies. Consistent to the old model price, p1 in Figure 3.13, Figure 3.23a shows a Ushaped pattern as substitutability between old and new model increases. However, Figure
3.23b and 3.23c show a fixed old price for all the parameter ranges of substitutability and
the new model quality. This shows that price setting for the old model neither depends on
the new model quality nor on the substitutability between the old and new models. See
Table 3.3. The old model price is just function of discount rate, δ. This suggests that the
old model price is solely determined by the volume of the demand shift from the old model
to the new model in the complex pricing strategy.

3.5.7

Profit

Figure 3.24a and 3.24b show the profit from the old model for both simple and complex
pricing strategies. For the simple pricing strategy, the profit from the old model is consistent
to the baseline model output. However, the profit from the old model of complex pricing
strategy looks quite different and is negative for all the parameter values. This shows that
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Figure 3.23: Extension: Old Model Price

(a) Simple Pricing

(b) Complex Pricing, p11

(c) Complex Pricing, p12
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Figure 3.24: Extension: Profit from Old Model

(a) Simple Pricing

(b) Complex Pricing

lowering the old model price in period 2 makes the firm worse off in terms of profit from the
old model.
Figure 3.25a and 3.25b show the profit from the new model for both simple and complex
pricing strategies. These two – Figure 3.25a and 3.25b – are consistent to baseline model.
The profit from the new model of simple pricing strategy is slightly greater than that of
complex pricing strategy.
Figure 3.26a and 3.26b show the total profit from both the new and old models. These
show are also consistent with the baseline model, showing a U-shaped pattern.
Figure 3.27a and 3.27b show the net total profit from the old and new models for both
simple and complex pricing strategies. Net total profit is defined as the total profit subtracted
by the total profit of the no demonstration case (Π − Πn ≡ π1 + π2 − {π1n + π2n }). Figure
3.27d shows that the simple pricing strategy dominates the baseline model. In other words,
selling the old model in period 2 makes the firm better off than discontinuing the old model
in period 2. Furthermore, lowering the old model price in period 2 reduces the total profit;
hence, the complex pricing strategy is inferior to the simple pricing strategy.
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Figure 3.25: Extension: Profit from New Model

(a) Simple Pricing

(b) Complex Pricing

(c) Baseline Model

(d) Baseline −Complex
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Figure 3.26: Extension: Total Profit

(a) Simple Pricing

3.5.8

(b) Complex Pricing

Summary of the Comparison

Now, I compare the equilibrium set of two different pricing models to the baseline model.
All the results of the comparison among three models are summarized at Table 3.4. First
of all, the delayed purchase of the complex model is greater than that of the simple model
where the quality of new model is relatively low and the substitutability between old and
S
C
new model is relatively high (e.g., q2d
< q2d
where low α2 and low γ, also see Table 3.23a).

This supports the real world phenomenon that Apply systematically price down on old
generation of iPhone when the firm launches the new iPhone. Next, the old model price
of the complex model is lower than that of the simple model by definition of two pricing
C
model (e.g., pC
11 < p12 ). Furthermore, the old model price of the simple pricing model is

lower than that of the baseline case (no old model available in period 2). Third, the new
model profit of the complex pricing model is greater than that of the baseline model only
when the substitutability between old and new model is low (e.g., π2N < π2C only when γ is
small). Under other parameter ranges, the complex pricing model is inferior than both the
baseline model and the simple pricing model in terms of profit. Lastly, the simple pricing
strategy is the most superior strategy among three strategies even when we considering the
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Figure 3.27: Extension: Net Total Profit from Old and New Model

(a) Simple Pricing

(b) Complex Pricing

(c) Baseline Model

(d) Baseline − Simple
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net benefit of product concept demonstration.

3.6

Discussion

My analysis provides new insights into the interplay between product positioning and a product concept demonstration that induces varying degrees of purchase delay while shaping the
firms inter-temporal pricing strategy. Interestingly, I find that a product concept demonstration can bring the new product’s price lower than that without a demonstration, and that
the amount of delayed purchases induced by the product concept demonstration is greatest
at very low or high levels of product substitutability, exhibiting a U-shaped pattern. My
results indicate that engaging in a pre-launch product concept demonstration is the optimal
strategy for the monopolistic firm with either horizontal or vertical differentiation. Product
concept demonstration is beneficial not only for the firm but also consumers. By giving
consumers higher utility when waiting for a period, the firm can increase the total profit and
the consumers can have a boost in their utility.

3.6.1

Future Research Directions

It is worthwhile to consider the uncertainty of quality, price, or possible delays in the launch
date. There are many possible scenarios for the firm to increase (or decrease) the price of
a new product (i.e., realized demand is much greater than expected, consumers feedback or
experts reviews are extremely favorable).
Researchers can extend this paper by analyzing a duopoly market with a product concept
demonstration. To have a closed form solution for such a case, one might need to assume
that only one firm demonstrates its product concept. One can solve the duopoly model
for a Nash game and for a Leader-Follower game. In the later case, only a leading firm
can demonstrate and set the retail price first and then smaller, follower firms can observe
the publics uptake of the price point and decide their retail price. Inter-temporal strategic
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interactions in the duopoly market might be different from those in the monopoly market.
Finally, I assume that all products experience diminishing marginal utility uniformly, by
setting β1 = β2 = β = 1. It will be interesting to consider the case of asymmetric diminishing
marginal utility, such as β1 < β2 (i.e., that the marginal utility decline of the new model
is steeper than that of the old model). The afore-mentioned scenario could create a set of
puzzling results concerning pricing and positioning in the two-periods monopoly market.

p1 γ(1−γ 2 )
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C

+

d

o



(−1+γ 2 )A2 E
C2

−1+p1 −p2 γ+α2 γ
−1+γ 2
p2 −α2 +γ−p1 γ
−1+γ 2
p2 −α2 +γ−p1 γ
−1+γ 2 δ


{−2+γ 2 (1+δ)}A B+α2 γ[4+12δ+γ 4 δ{2+δ(7+6δ)}−γ 2 {2+δ(12+17δ)}]
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Table 3.4: Result Summary for Model Extensions
q11 a
q12
q1 c
q2
q2D
p1
p2
π1
π2
Πf
Π − Πn
a

g

C<S b
S<C
N <S<C
C<S<N
C < S < N or S < C < N
C<S<N e
C<N <S
C
(<N <S
C < N < S if γ is big.
N < C < S otherwise.
C<N <S
C<N <S

d

I assume the new product quality is weakly superior to the old product one (α2 ≥ 1).
N: No old model available in period 2, S: Simple pricing strategy (p1 = p11 = p12 ), C: Complex pricing
strategy (p11 > p12 ).
c
For simple pricing strategy, q1 ≡ q11 + q12 and for complex pricing strategy, q1 ≡ q11 + q1d + q12 .
d
See Figure 3.21c for detail parameter ranges.
e
C(p12 ) < C(p11 ) < S(p1 ) < N (p1 )
f
Π ≡ π1 + π2 .
g
Πn ≡ π1n + π2n .
b

Appendix A
Comparative Statics
Appendix B shows the details for Table 3.2 Comparative Statics. First, I show how I get
the signs for each cell in Table 3.2 by demonstrating analytical approach. Next, if it is too
complicated to tell the sign with analytical approach, I show the results of the chosen set of
points by using a numerical method.
Assumption 1. 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
Assumption 2. 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
Assumption 3. 1 ≤ α2 ≤ 2

•

∂p1
∂α2

∂p1
γ(γ 2 δ − 2)(1 − δ)
=
. Since γ 2 (6δ +1)−8 < 0, (γ 2 δ −2) <
∂α2
γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8
0, and (1 − δ) ≤ 0 by Assumption 1,2, and 3, both the numerator is weakly positive
∂p1
and the denominator is positive. Hence,
> 0. Q.E.D.
∂α2
Proof. From Table 3.1,
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∂p2
∂α2

∂p2
7γ 2 δ − 8)
=
. Since the numerator is negative
∂α2
2(γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8)
∂p2
> 0. Q.E.D.
and the denominator is negative. Therefore,
∂α2

Proof. From Table 3.1,

•

∂q1
∂α2

∂q1
γ(δ(γ 2 (3δ + 4) − 4) − 4) − 4)
=
. Note that δ(γ 2 (3δ +
∂α2
2(γ 2 δ − 1)(γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8)
4) − 4) ≤ 3 when δ = 1 and γ + 1. This implies that the numerator is negative. Since
Proof. From Table 3.1,

(γ 2 δ − 1) < 0 and (γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8) < 0, the numerative is weakly positive. This proves
∂q1
≤ 0. Q.E.D.
∂α2
•

∂q2
∂α2

∂q2
5γ 2 δ + 2γ 2 − 8)
=
. Since both the numerator and the
∂α2
(2(γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8)
∂q2
denominator are negative. Therefore,
> 0. Q.E.D.
∂α2
Proof. From Table 3.1,

•

∂q2D
∂α2

∂q2
2γ 4 δ(δ − 1) + γ 2 (2 − 9δ) + 8)
=
. I note that −0.5 ≤
∂α2
2(γ 2 δ − 1)(γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8)
2γ 4 δ(δ − 1) ≤ 0 and 1 ≤ γ 2 (2 − 9δ) + 8 ≤ 10. Hence, the numerator is always positive.
Proof. From Table 3.1,

Since (γ 2 δ − 1) ≤ 0 and (γ 2 (6δ + 1) − 8) < 0, the denominator are weakly positive for
∂q2D
> 0. Q.E.D.
all values of γ and δ. Therefore,
∂α2
•

∂(π1 + π2 )
γ(δγ 2 (4 + 3δ) − 4(δ + 1))
≥ 0 if α2 > 2
∂α2
(γ δ − 2)(8 + γ 2 δ 2 − 8γ 2 δ)
∂(π1 + π2 )
2γ(γ 2 δ − 2)(δ(γ 2 (4 + 3δ) − 4) − 4) − 2α2 (γ 2 δ − 2)2 (8 + γ 2 (−8 + δ)δ)
Proof.
=
∂α2
4(γ 2 (1 + 6δ) − 8)(2 + γ 2 δ(γ 2 δ − 3))
Note that the denominator is always negative because γ 2 (1 + 6δ) − 8 < 0 and 2 +
γ 2 δ(γ 2 δ − 3) = γ 4 δ 2 − 3γ 2 δ + 2 = (γ 2 δ − 1)(γ 1 δ − 2) ≥ 0 since γ 2 δ ≤ 0. Now,
∂(π1 + π2 )
the sign of
depends on the numerator. If the first term is greater than
∂α2
γ(δγ 2 (4 + 3δ) − 4(δ + 1))
the second, α2 > 2
, then the numerator is negative, hence,
(γ δ − 2)(8 + γ 2 δ 2 − 8γ 2 δ)
∂(π1 + π2 )
≥ 0.
∂α2
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For the signs with respect to the substitutability, γ, we investigate the numerical results
∂(π1 + π2 )
∂p1 ∂p2 ∂q1 ∂q2 ∂q2D
,
,
,
,
, and
have very complex
because the expressions for
∂γ ∂γ ∂γ ∂γ ∂γ
∂γ
forms to tell the sign. (“+/−” denotes inverted U-shaped pattern and “−/+” shows Ushaped pattern as the substitutability goes to 1.)
•

•

•

∂p1
shows overall inverted U-shaped pattern of old model price with respect to the
∂γ
substitutability except only one with α2 = 1.5 and δ = 0.6.
∂p2
shows overall negative sign of new model price with respect to the substitutability.
∂γ
See Table A.2
∂q1
shows overall negative sign of old model quantity with respect to the the substi∂γ
tutability when the new model quality is higher than the old model, such as α2 > α1 .
See Table A.3

•

•

•

∂q2
shows overall positive sign of new model quantity with respect to the the substi∂γ
tutability. See Table A.4
∂q2D
shows overall a U-shaped pattern of delayed purchases with respect to the sub∂γ
stitutability. See Table A.5
∂(π1 + π2 )
shows overall negative sign of total profit with respect to the substitutabil∂γ
ity. See Table A.6

Similarly, for the signs with respect to the discounting factor, δ, we investigate the nu∂p1 ∂p2 ∂q1 ∂q2 ∂q2D
∂(π1 + π2 )
merical results because the expressions for
,
,
,
,
, and
have
∂δ ∂δ ∂δ ∂δ
∂δ
∂δ
very complex forms to tell the sign.
•

∂p1
shows overall negative sign of old model price with respect to the discounting
∂δ
factor. See Table A.7
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Table A.1: Comparative Statics for
∂p1
∂γ

δ

∂p1
∂γ

α2
0.5
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

0.7
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

0.9
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

1
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

1.1
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

Table A.2: Comparative Statics for
∂p2
∂γ

1.5
+
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

∂p2
∂γ

α2
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

δ

1.3
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−
+/−

0.5
−
−
−
−
−

0.7
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−
−
−
−
−

1
−
−
−
−
−

1.1
−
−
−
−
−

1.3
−
−
−
−
−

Table A.3: Comparative Statics for
∂q1
∂γ

1.5
−
−
−
−
−

∂q1
∂γ

α2
1.1
−
−
−
−
−

1.3
−
−
−
−
−

Table A.4: Comparative Statics for

∂q2
∂γ

0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

δ

0.5
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

0.7
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

∂q2
∂γ

δ

0.9
−
−
−/+
−/+
−/+

1
−
−
−
−
−

1.5
−
−
−
−
−

α2
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

0.5
+
+
+
+
+

0.7
+
+
+
+
+

0.9
+
+
+
+
+

1
+
+
+
+
+

1.1
+
+
+
+
+

1.3
+
+
+
+
+

1.5
+
+
+
+
+
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Table A.5: Comparative Statics for
∂q2D
∂γ

α2
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

δ

0.5
−
−
−
−
−

0.7
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

1
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

1.1
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

Table A.6: Comparative Statics for
∂(π1 + π2 )
∂γ

δ

•

•

•

•

∂q2D
∂γ

1.3
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

1.5
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

∂(π1 +π2 )
∂γ

α2
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1

0.5
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

0.7
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−
−
−
−
−

1
−
−
−
−
−

1.1
−
−
−
−
−

1.3
−
−
−
−
−

1.5
−
−/+
−/+
−/+
−/+

∂p2
shows overall negative sign of new model price with respect to the discounting
∂δ
factor. See Table A.8
∂q1
shows overall negative sign of old model quantity with respect to the discounting
∂δ
factor. See Table A.9
∂q2
shows overall positive sign of old model price with respect to the discounting factor.
∂δ
See Table A.10
∂q2D
shows overall positive sign of delayed purchases with respect to the discounting
∂δ
factor. Note that four pairs of parameter values in Table A.11 are outside of feasible
range of this analysis.

•

∂(π1 + π2 )
Note that four pairs of parameter values in Table A.12 are outside of feasible
∂δ
range of this analysis.
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Table A.7: Comparative Statics for
∂p1
∂δ

α2
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99

γ

0.5
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.7
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−
−
−
−
−
−

1
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.1
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.3
−
−
−
−
−
−

Table A.8: Comparative Statics for
∂p2
∂δ

0.5
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.7
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−
−
−
−
−
−

1
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.1
−
−
−
−
−
−

∂p2
∂δ

1.3
−
−
−
−
−
−

Table A.9: Comparative Statics for
∂q1
∂δ

γ

1.5
−
−
−
−
−
−

α2
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99

γ

∂p1
∂δ

1.5
−
−
−
−
−
−

∂q1
∂δ

α2
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99

0.5
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.7
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−
−
−
−
−
−

1
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.1
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.3
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.5
−
−
−
−
−
−
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Table A.10: Comparative Statics for
∂q2
∂δ

γ

α2
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99

0.5
+
+
+
+
+
+

0.7
+
+
+
+
+
+

0.9
+
+
+
+
+
+

1
+
+
+
+
+
+

1.1
+
+
+
+
+
+

1.3
+
+
+
+
+
+

Table A.11: Comparative Statics for
∂q2D
∂δ

γ

1.5
+
+
+
+
+
+

∂q2D
∂δ

α2
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99

0.5
+
+
+
+
+
−

0.7
+
+
+
+
+
−

0.9
+
+
+
+
+
+

1
+
+
+
+
+
+

1.1
+
+
+
+
+
+

Table A.12: Comparative Statics for
∂(π1 + π2 )
∂δ

γ

∂q2
∂δ

1.3
+
+
+
+
+
+

1.5
+
+
+
+
+
+

∂(π1 +π2 )
∂δ

α2
0.01
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99

0.5
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.7
−
−
−
−
−
−

0.9
−
−
−
−
−
−

1
−
−
−
−
−
−

1.1
−
−
−
−
−
−/+

1.3
−
−
−
−
−
−/+

1.5
−
−
−
−
−/+
−/+
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